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1 The Basis on which this Report has been prepared 
1.1 The sources of my own knowledge of IVTS/Hawala Banking 
1.1.1 From the spring of 1999 to the autumn of 2001 I was engaged more or less full time in 
a study entitled Kinship, Entrepreneurship and the Transnational Circulation of Assets, 
financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. The principle objective of the project 
was to compare and contrast the dynamics of the circulation of social, economic and cultural 
assets as between the UK and three of the major sources of immigration from South Asia – 
Mirpur District in Pakistan, Jullundur District in India, and Sylhet District in Bangladesh. In 
the course of this project I made several field trips to South Asia, as well as engaging in an 
intensive scrutiny of migrants’ behaviour in the UK. As a result I was able to construct a 
detailed structural model of the development and contemporary dynamics of the transnational 
networks which migrants from each area had built up, and of the impact which the very 
substantial asset flows thereby generated were having on the local economies of migrants’ 
villages of origin back in South Asia. I am currently in the midst of publishing formal 
academic accounts of my findings with respect to these developments. 
1.1.2 During the course of my fieldwork it soon became apparent that the greater part of 
this very substantial flow of remittances was being transmitted through ‘informal’ channels, 
rather than through the formal banking system. But although straightforward ethnographic 
methods enabled me to gain a reasonably detailed understanding of the basic principles in 
terms of which the system of value transfer – commonly known as ‘hawala’ or ‘hundi’ – 
operated, I was not surprised to find that the actual operators of the system were most 
reluctant to discuss what they regarded as their commercial secrets. Hence whilst I was well 
aware of the existence and large contemporary scale of hawala transactions, and was also 
able to explore the historical growth of hawala banking practices from their early mediaeval 
origins, during the course of my project fieldwork I found it virtually impossible to gain 
access to really detailed information about the transactions themselves. 
1.1.3 All this changed, however, when I was asked if I was in a position to prepare an 
expert report on Hawala, given that Customs and Excise had charged several Hawala 
operators in Bradford, Leeds and Halifax with Money Laundering. Not only was I able to 
sketch out the broad logic of the way in which Hawala bankers facilitated International Value 
Transfers on behalf of their clients, but their clients – who were by now faced with extremely 
serious charges – were only too willing to discuss the details of their procedures with me, as 
well as to show me all the records which they had kept of their hawala transactions. As a 
result I was at long last in a position to piece together the way in which that dimension of the 
contemporary Hawala system which is driven by the remittance flows generated by South 
Asian settlers in Britain actually operates.   
1.1.4 This took some time to master. Enquiries amongst fellow academics working in 
South, Central, East and South East Asia revealed that whilst almost everyone come across 
similarly structured Informal Value Transfer systems in the course of their own fieldwork, 
no-one had any greater knowledge of the precise details of their internal dynamics than did I. 
Moreover a trawl on the Internet threw up no more than a handful of responses, although one 
proved to be particularly valuable: a report entitled Informal Value Transfer Systems and 
Criminal Organisations: a study of so-called underground networks (hereafter IVTS), 
prepared by Professor Nikos Passas on behalf of the Dutch Ministry of Justice.  
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1.1.5 But although I initially found Professor Passas pioneering report immensely helpful, 
not least because it was a pioneering attempt to make a systematic study of hawala 
transactions, I soon became acutely aware of its limitations. Under the terms of his contract 
Professor Passas was operating under extremely tight time constraints, with the result (as he 
himself emphasises) that he had not been able to carry out nearly as much fieldwork as he 
would have wished; secondly the way in which his research was structured was such that he 
had little alternative but to take a top-down view of the operation of hawala, with the result 
that much of the detail revealed by taking a complementary ‘bottom-up’ perspective was 
missing from his report. 
1.1.6 As a consequence of being able to combine my own prior ethnographic knowledge of 
transnationally active South Asian communities, the findings and conclusions of fellow 
academic  analysts such as Professor Passas and Dr. John Wilson of the IMF, as well as the 
additional understandings I have acquired as a result of considering the details of a number of 
hawala operations where I was instructed to act as an expert witness, my own knowledge and 
understanding of just how contemporary hawala system actually operates has developed by 
leaps and bounds during the course of the past eighteen months.  
1.1.7 However I should also emphasise that this has also been a collective exercise: at the 
outset I learned a great deal from Professor Passas’ study cited above, and during the past 
year from the work of Dr. Wilson, who is Chief Economist in the Middle Eastern Division of 
the IMF. In this respect two documents were particularly illuminating: firstly a Conference 
paper which presented Dr. Wilson of the IMF in May 2002, in which he set out in broad 
brushstrokes the conclusions he begun to draw as a result of the brief he had been given to 
prepare a formal report on Hawala for the IMF/World Bank, and finally the full Report itself 
which is due to be published in the next few days, but of which Dr. Wilson was kind enough 
to provide me with an advance copy for my comments. While I cannot speak on Dr. Wilson’s 
behalf, I suspect that they may well have found my contributions to the discussion of just 
how hawala operates just as illuminating as I found his. Moreover the process of mutual 
discussion continues: I have been the prime mover in setting up a workshop to discuss the 
findings and conclusions of Dr. Wilson’s about-to-be published IMF report on the subject 
which is to be held at the Department for International Development on January 10th 2003.  
1.1.8 Further light has been thrown on the issues by Dr. Wilson’s colleague Dr. Mohammed 
El-Qorchi, especially in his contribution to the IMF’s quarterly magazine Finance and 
Development. 
1.2 My approach to the issues at stake in these proceedings  
1.2.1 It should by now be quite clear that without an understanding of the way in which 
contemporary hawala systems operate, it is quite impossible to make any kind of informed 
judgement about the legal status of the complex sets of financial transactions which have 
given rise to these proceedings. With this in mind this report seeks to present a detailed 
review of the relevant background issues. These include:  
• The historical origins of hawala banking systems 
• The contemporary role of hawala banking in South Asia, within the South Asian diaspora, 
and in global trading networks 
• The foundations of the relationships of trust which are the key to the successful operation 
of networks  
• Three levels of hawala transaction: retail, wholesale and corporate.  
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• The key role of Dubai in the settlement of hawala swaps in both the Middle East and 
South Asia 
• The flows and counter-flows of value which underpin settlement 
• The role of Hawala in contemporary patterns of world trade 
My objective, in other words, is to set out the logic of contemporary hawala transactions as 
well as the institutional framework within which it is currently organised.  
2 The Historical origins of Hawala  
2.1 Earliest references 
2.1.1 The earliest reference to hawala that I have so far been able to track down is in 
Abraham Udovitch’s monograph on Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam (Princeton, 
1970), for which one of his principal sources is Al-mabsut, a legal commentary prepared by 
the Egyptian scholar Sarakhshi in the 11th Century CE. Udovitich’s discussion is very largely 
concerned with the legal underpinnings of long-distance trade, and he uses Sarakhshi’s work 
to identify hawala as ‘a transfer of debt’. Since Islamic Law was much more at ease with the 
prospect of ‘real’ debts being transferred between individuals than ‘fictional’ credits, hawala 
appears to have been the preferred method of organising the financial aspects of long-
distance trade in the eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, Mesopotamia and Iran since the 
early medieval period of Islam.  
2.1.2 Its original objective of hawala was to facilitate all aspects of long distance trade, 
whether by ship down the Red Sea and across the Indian Ocean, or by camel through 
Mesopotamia and Iran to Central Asia and China. Financial security was always a major 
problem for such traders. Not only was the protection of  one’s trade goods from thieves and 
pirates was a challenging enough task in its own right, but the protection of the bullion 
needed to acquire goods in a distant market, let alone that generated through profitable 
trading activities away from one’s home base was even more of a headache. A banking 
system of some kind would obviate the worst of these worries.  
2.2 Hawala as a system of Trust 
2.2.1 The hawala system which emerged as a response to these challenges not only had to 
be reliable and effective, but also to be congruent with the principles of Islamic Law. The 
context in which these developments occurred was equally specific. Not only were the roads 
infested with highwaymen and the sea with pirates, but in a period before telegrams and 
telephones, let alone the internet, information-transfer across long distances was extremely 
slow. It followed that trust was at a huge premium if long-distance trade was to be financed 
with smoothness and safety. With such considerations in mind, a tight-knit extended family – 
whose members could by definition have absolute trust in each other – appears to have lain at 
the core of every Hawala operation. Members of such a family, whose inter-linkages were 
often reinforced by inter-marriage and/or through common sectarian affiliation, could then 
establish and sustain residential bases in two or more major trading centres which were far 
removed from one another, but between which a good deal of commercial business was 
transacted. They could then open for business. 
2.2.2 With such a spatially-extended kinship network in place, visiting traders in any one of 
those centres could either deposit funds (or failing that provide goods or property as a surety 
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to) the custodian of that arm of the hawala business, who would in turn provide a hundi 
(effectively a letter of credit), even if in technical terms [and in keeping with Islamic Law] 
the document was in fact a letter of acknowledgement of debt to the depositor which was 
encashable either on demand, or at some fixed date in the future, in some distant trading 
centre where another arm of the family was based. This system was of immense utility to 
merchants engaged in long-distance trade, above all because it enabled them to conduct their 
business without having to carry large amounts of bullion over long distances. 
2.2.3 In comparison with most contemporary (‘overground’) forms of international 
banking, hawala lay very firmly at the informal rather than the formal end of the spectrum. 
Security was guaranteed not so much through setting up limited companies with complex 
(and costly) internal structures regulated by auditors and regulated by the state, but through 
highly personalised relationships of trust. Hence in the early days Hawala operators were 
invariably close kin, and the intensity of the multi-stranded relationships between themselves 
provided a guarantee that one arm of the family business would not rip off another. Secondly 
their customers, the merchants who wished to use the hawala system to transfer funds, 
invariably chose hawala operators who had a clear connection with their own community, 
and with whom they in turn had multi-form connections.  
2.2.4 In this context it is also worth emphasising just how these multi-form connections 
underwrote trust, for they also gave rise to some highly effective sanctions against 
malfeasance. In a world where everyone belonged to tight knit communities, and non-
membership of such a community and its associated networks of reciprocity left lone 
individuals with no protection against naked exploitation, transgressing the network’s norms 
of reciprocity had quite disastrous implications. It was not just that the transgressor would 
thereafter be regarded as an unreliable business partner; he would also find that his presence 
at all collective meetings and celebrations was unwelcome, that visitors would no longer 
come to his house, that he would find it almost impossible to arrange suitable marriages for 
his children, and he might well find that his married daughters would be returned to him in 
comprehensive ignominy. In other words everyone was (and is) well aware that extremely 
powerful sanctions can very easily be brought down on the heads of anyone who wilfully 
broke the obligations of trust which were central to network membership.  
2.2.5 It was precisely these kinds of understandings in which the security of relationships 
between geographically distant hawaladars, as well as between each of those hawaladars and 
their customers, were grounded. It was such considerations which provided a guarantee that 
the hawala operators would not rip off their customers – or vice-versa – as an untrustworthy 
stranger might very well get away with doing.  
2.3 Records and Record Keeping 
But although hawala was therefore a highly personal system of banking, it was certainly not 
conducted on a record-less basis. On the one hand customers who had deposited funds with 
them were routinely provided with a hundi, a promissory note recording the system’s 
condition of indebtedness to them. Secondly whilst Hawala operators frequently relied very 
heavily on memory, there was no way in which they could hope accurately to remember all 
aspects of the increasingly complex transactions in which they were engaged. Hence they 
also developed their own very elaborate – and very private – forms of record keeping. Indeed 
in a manner parallel to the ‘mysteries’ of guilds in mediaeval Europe, in many parts of the 
Indian subcontinent such traders created their own exclusive script, which non-specialists 
were wholly unable to decipher, in order to guarantee the security of their private records.  
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2.4 The internal dynamics of hawala 
2.4.1 Finally it is worth remembering that if current practice is anything to go by, the vast 
majority of those who regularly utilised the system would have had very little understanding 
of just how the whole system operated such that ‘flying money’ (as the Chinese aptly 
describe hawala) could be produced at the drop of a hat in very distant locations. However 
this ‘mystery’ is in fact quite easily explained. Although the system worked in such a way 
that it appeared to its customers as being a supremely effective means of money transmission 
– for it enabled them to feed funds into one end of the network and take them out again as 
and when they needed them in far-distant places – the volume of physical money/bullion-
transmission was (and in many respects still is) dramatically smaller than one might expect if 
one simply focussed on each transaction separately. Indeed the ideal hawala system (at least 
as far as its operators were and are concerned) is one in which no physical transmission of 
money takes place at all (IMF/WB: 19). Once we consider the operation of hawala in 
systematic terms, it is very easy to see how this occurs.  
2.4.2 In a situation where there are a multiplicity of transactions in which funds are being 
sent back and forth to finance trade between two or more hawala centres (let us say 
Damascus and Hormuz, for example), and if the total value of the cash flows in either 
direction are broadly in balance, then it follows that there is no need for the bullion (or some 
other form of credit) deposited by customers in Damascus to be sent physically to Hormuz, if 
the deposits in Damascus could be passed out to creditors from Hormuz, and the deposits 
taken in Hormuz were returned to creditors from Damascus once they arrived back in their 
home base. With such a system in place customers could be kept happy by taking a margin on 
these transactions which was substantially less than the cost (and danger) of physically 
transferring bullion from one centre to another, whilst hawala bankers could make substantial 
profits from the relatively small margins which they took on the funds which they were in 
effect constantly re-circulating as between differing groups of customers. The traditional 
process of hawala therefore replicated a key component of contemporary banking practice, 
even though it did so within the context of an organisation in which security was grounded in 
informal relationships of trust rather than more ‘modern’ (and certainly far more expensive) 
bureaucratic procedures.  
3 Hawala in the contemporary world 
3.1 The changing context 
3.1.1 During the past two centuries patterns of global trade have been transformed as 
Britain and then the United States gained global dominance, so much that their national 
currencies successively became the vehicle through which prices were quoted, deals agreed 
and invoices settled in the greater part of international trade. Along with this European-style 
Banks – operating in terms of such formal bureaucratic procedures – also moved into a 
position of global dominance. But although it was widely assumed, at least from a European 
perspective, that the more informal systems of value transfer such as hawala had 
consequently been reduced to a condition of terminal collapse, it has now become apparent 
that this view was mistaken. Not only did Hawala/IVTS systems survive the onslaught to 
which they were subjected, albeit on the margins of the new mainstream, but having made the 
necessary adjustments to the new conditions, have expanded rapidly once again during the 
course of the last few decades.  
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3.1.2 There are several reasons for the recent re-emergence of hawala transactions. Firstly, 
and perhaps most importantly, there has been rapid growth in the number immigrants from 
the third world living and working in Europe and North America, who have begun to send 
every larger sums of money as remittances to their families back home; secondly there has 
been an equally rapid growth in business and manufacturing activity in South, East, and 
South East Asia, much of which is located in countries such as India, China – and indeed 
post-revolutionary Iran – where formal restrictions on foreign exchange are so restrictive as 
to constitute a virtual stranglehold on business enterprise; and thirdly the replacement of the 
old-fashioned telegram with far speedier – and far cheaper – means of data transmission via 
fax and the internet. Taken together, these developments have enabled Asian financial 
entrepreneurs to put together an alternative system of international value transmission which 
is much easier to access, far swifter, very much less expensive and just as reliable as that 
provided by the formal banking system.  
3.2 Hawala, Labour migration and remittances 
3.2.1 As far as the economics of hawala are concerned, Wilson’s account in the Conference 
Paper which he presented in May 2002 is both clear and illuminating: 
Why would Hawala be widely used? Here there is some consensus on the 
motivations. Hawala-type informal transfers are often faster, more reliable, reach 
more destinations, sometimes benefit from a better exchange rate, and can be much 
cheaper than transfers through established, licensed financial institutions. Hawala-
type transactions will be especially popular in countries where there are large ethnic 
or expatriate worker populations who often make transfers or remittances to their 
families in home…. 
An expatriate worker uses an intermediary, the hawaladar, to arrange a remittance to 
his home country. He makes payment in dollars or other convertible currency. The 
hawaladar in A contacts a counterpart in the receiving country, B, who makes 
payment in local currency to the remitter’s family or other beneficiary. Obviously, 
some network of family or connections among hawaladars is required to make such a 
system work on a large-scale and ongoing basis. Small scale hawaladars seem to be 
concentrated in certain shops and businesses in the relevant communities: travel 
agencies are a favourite candidate; sometimes laundries and food stores. Money 
exchanges are reported to sometimes have back-room hawala operations. 
The economic attraction of hawala to the remitter usually is the speed, low cost, and 
reliability of the system compared to use of an established financial institution. It has 
been argued (and mission discussions tended to confirm) that this system often has 
advantages compared to banks, money exchanges, Western Union, MoneyGram, and 
other providers of this service. Hawala-type transactions also provide special 
advantages in situations where the remitting country has a convertible currency and 
no capital controls, and the receiving country has inconvertible currency and/or a 
black market exchange rate. Such transactions often can be carried out at better rate 
than the official rate, also to the benefit of the remitter and recipient. (Wilson, 2002: 3 
– 4). 
3.2.2 Several points emerge from Wilson’s argument. Firstly that contemporary hawala has 
a clear economic rationale: using hawala rather than the formal banking system has real 
advantages as far as both the sender and the recipient are concerned. Secondly that the 
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development of contemporary hawala operations is closely linked to the emergence of large 
expatriate worker populations who make remittances to their families at home. Thirdly that 
some network of family or connections among hawaladars is required to make the system 
work on a large scale and ongoing basis. As we shall see, all these conditions are powerfully 
fulfilled in the case of Britain’s Pakistani population.  
3.3 The global scale of migrant remittances 
Whilst Dr Wilson avoids making an estimate of the global scale of financial flows currently 
generated by migrant remittances, not least because a central thrust of his argument that 
whenever such is derived from the measurement of flows through formal channels, the 
outcome will be a substantial underestimate of the true figure, such estimates are readily 
available elsewhere. Hence, for example, Susan F. Martin, Director of the Institute for the 
Study of International Migration at Georgetown University argues 
3.3.1 Worldwide, the flow of remittances exceeds $100,000 million per year, with more 
than 60 percent going to developing countries. Having presented these statistics, it is worth 
noting the weaknesses of existing data on remittances. These numbers likely under-represent 
the scale of remittances by thousands of millions of dollars since many countries have 
inadequate processes for estimating or reporting on the funds remitted by foreign workers.  
 (http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0901/ijee/martin.htm) 
 
Within that broad framework there is not only widespread agreement that in a South Asian 
context not only is Pakistan’s economy particularly heavily dependent on the large-scale 
inflow of migrant remittances, but also that a particularly high proportion of that inflow is 
directed through informal rather than formal channels. Once again Wilson is very helpful on 
this score. Having once again emphasised that ‘Quantification effort will not be undertaken 
today’, he nevertheless goes on to indicate that  
rumour, hearsay, the literature, and conversations on our recent mission do suggest 
that some countries fall into certain categories in this regard. There is remarkable 
consensus that the “degree of Hawala” for inward remittances to Pakistan is very 
high, and likely is also high for several other South Asian countries. (Wilson 2002: 
11) 
In addition to singling out Pakistan as a country where hawala plays an extremely salient role 
in the organisation of foreign exchange transactions, Wilson also very specifically identifies 
the local hub through which the majority of these transactions are organised: the United Arab 
Emirates. As he puts it: 
Where are such entities concentrated? We can’t tell for sure but, for various reasons 
Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, has often been singled out as a location where 
many hawala transactions are consolidated and cleared. There are also 105 exchange 
houses in the U.A.E., and for some reason even as we speak the U.A.E. authorities are 
holding an International Conference on Hawala, with one of my mission colleagues as 
a featured speaker. (Wilson, 2002: 6) 
3.4 Hawala and international trade 
3.4.1 Although there is no dispute that migrant remittances have powerfully reinforced the 
use of hawala (as well as what Professor Passas has usefully identified in more general terms 
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as Informal Value Transfer Systems) in virtually all corners of the globe, remittances are by 
no means the only kind of value transfers for which such systems provide a vehicle. Precisely 
because of the strictness with which foreign exchange transactions are regulated by the state 
in many parts of the non-European world, let alone exceedingly high levels of taxation and 
excise duty, severe controls on what may or may not be manufactured, exported and 
imported, all of which are further underlined by the non-convertibility of domestic currencies, 
businessmen and manufacturers who find themselves subjected to such restrictions have 
increasingly turned to hawala as means of facilitating their transactions with trading partners 
overseas.  
3.4.2 Hence the growth of remittance driven value transfers moving broadly from the first 
world to the third has been matched by the parallel growth of funds being counter-transferred 
in the opposite direction, thus generating a ‘settlement’ in banking terms. Hence whilst 
hawala outflows (at least if viewed from a metropolitan perspective) have thus far attracted 
the greatest degree of analytical attention, it follows (as the recent IMF/World Bank report 
explicitly recognises) that the reverse flow needed to achieve settlement must by definition be 
in a scale which closely matches the remittance outflow. Whilst even less is known about 
these counter-transfers than about the outflow of migrant remittances, the recent IMF/WB 
report nevertheless presents a long list of the various forms which such counter-transfers 
might take. They include 
• Simple reverse hawala 
• Complex reverse hawala 
• Bilateral financial settlement 
• Multilateral financial settlement 
• Bilateral trade 
• Multilateral trade 
• Misstatement of trade values (i.e. ‘under- and over-invoicing’) 
• Smuggling – e.g. the purchase of gold in Dubai for customers in India 
• Purchase of health and educational services overseas 
• International investment services and capital flight  
3.4.3 Last but not least the Report also points to the likely key role of high level 
consolidators who effectively arrange wholesale hawala swaps on a global scale. (IMF/WB 
2003:  20 – 23) Whilst the Report emphasises that at present neither the IMF nor the World 
Bank can provide an accurate measure of the current scale of Hawala transfers (although by 
common agreement it is very large), and also that even less is known about the reverse 
transfers which are the necessary counterpart of the slightly better understood outward flow 
of migrant remittances, the Report nevertheless concludes that in structural terms,  
the accounting details of hawala transactions are similar to other kinds of international 
payments, including those that go through the banking system. Like the hawala system, 
banks do not necessarily move physical cash between branches or correspondent banks 
when effecting transfers. The main difference between hawala and formal institutions is 
that the subsequent settlement of accounts usually remains outside formal operating 
channels that can be monitored by national authorities. (IMF/WB 2003: 36) 
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4 Hawala in a Contemporary South Asia  
4.1 My own specific knowledge-base 
4.1.1 Turning now to my own professional experience, I can readily confirm that the rapid 
recent growth of hawala transactions in India and Pakistan has been strongly associated with 
the onset of large-scale labour migration to a wide variety of overseas destinations, which 
rapidly precipitated a demand for long-distance money-transfer facilities. Over the course of 
the past thirty years I have made numerous visits to the Punjab region of northern India and 
Pakistan to conduct ethnographic fieldwork, and have also kept in equally close touch with 
the UK-based communities which settlers from these areas have constructed. In doing so I 
have watched at first hand the transfer of remittances go through a series of phases of growth 
and decline, with varying use of both Banks and the hawala sector as a means of money 
transfer. However during the course of conversations with members of these communities, as 
well as a result of my efforts to monitor the academic literature, I also learned a great deal 
about movements from rural Punjab (as well as from other regions in South Asia) to East 
Africa, the oil-rich states in the Persian gulf, and more recently to North America.  
4.1.2 It is also worth noting that the internet has now become a very useful source of 
information on Hawala. When I first began to look for anything that had been posted up on 
the subject rather more than a year ago, almost nothing was to be found on the subject: 
however a great deal more material has appeared since. Moreover the ‘Exchanges’ in Dubai 
which are the principal vehicles through which hawala flows are articulated on a global basis 
have also begun to have an increasing – and extremely illuminating – presence on the web. I 
have also made the fullest possible use of these sources.  
4.2 The early phases of emigration and the initial growth of hawala 
4.2.1 My own personal knowledge of Hawala operations in grounded in my long-standing 
interest in immigrant inflows from South Asia to the UK, and most especially from Mirpur 
District in Pakistan and Jullundur District in India. Taken together, these two relatively small 
areas are the original homelands of approximately half of Britain’s current 2 million strong 
South Asian population. Emigration from both areas has a long history, stretching back to 
well before the beginning of the twentieth century.  
4.2.2 From the 1880s onwards Mirpuris served as stokers on merchant ships sailing out of 
Karachi and Bombay, whilst the earliest destinations of Sikh emigrants from Jullundur were 
Hong-Kong, British Columbia and East Africa, where settlements begin to be established 
from the beginning of the last century onwards. Both groups established their initial 
bridgeheads in the UK shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War, and mass 
migration began in response to the intense shortage unskilled and semi-skilled workers which 
developed in many of the more traditional sections of British industry between the late 1940s 
and the late 1970s. During the early phases of settlement, when the immigrant population was 
all male, virtually everyone remitted the greater part of their earnings (of which they were 
often able to save as much as 80% by working long hours and living extremely frugally) 
straight back home. When families were reunited following the arrival of wives and children 
(from the mid-60s for the Jullunduri Sikhs, and from the late 70s onwards for the Mirpuris), 
their rate of savings, and hence of remittances, dropped very sharply. However the outflow 
has since picked up substantially, especially in the case of the Mirpuris (and indeed all other 
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Pakistanis), who have generally kept in much closer touch with their home-bases in Pakistan 
than have their neighbours from India.  
4.2.3 During the early days of settlement, remitting their savings back to their families in 
South Asia was often a far from straightforward operation. Many of the early settlers were 
illiterate, and hence ill at ease with and distrustful of the procedures of formal banking 
systems; secondly there were no banks – let alone banks with facilities for dealing with 
foreign exchange – to be found in the relatively remote rural areas from which most of them 
were drawn; moreover even if there was a suitable bank which was accessible to their kin 
back home, formal banking procedures were such that it could take weeks or even months 
before a remittance arrived at its destination. 
4.2.4 In the very earliest days the Post Office appears to have been a favoured means 
whereby migrant workers could send remittances back to their families. Since their homes lay 
in what was then still British India, and since the Indian Postal Service maintained offices 
made deliveries even in the most remote of rural areas, this was a very effective means of 
sending money home, even though – in the days long before air mail – it often took a very 
long time for their money to arrive. However some time after the end of the Second World 
War this system began to be superseded. As the number of South Asian settlers grew, Hawala 
brokers began to step in to fill the gap, not least because they could offer a swift and 
personalised service. Within days of a deposit being made with a hawala operator in Bradford 
or Birmingham, a courier on a bicycle would appear in the sender’s home village, and when 
the assigned recipient had been identified, the cash would be delivered in person. Few of my 
(now elderly) informants had any idea as to just how the system worked. All they knew that 
the system was swift, efficient and safe.  
4.3 The partial eclipse of hawala during the 1970s and 80s 
4.3.1 By the time I began to conduct my fieldwork in the early 1970s, Hawala had lost its 
virtual monopoly over the transmission of migrant remittances from Britain back to India and 
Pakistan. There were several reasons for this. Firstly the flow of funds generated by migrants 
to the UK soon became so large that India’s, and most especially Pakistan’s, formally 
organised banks sector stepped in to make the most of the commercial opportunities which 
this inflow represented, especially since the greater part of the remittance inflow (especially 
in Pakistan) was saved rather than spent. Very soon even the smallest villages in high 
emigrant areas in Pakistan boasted branches of all five of the country’s major banks, not only 
to facilitate the transfer of funds, but also to provide a safe haven for migrants’ savings. 
Before long each such branch found itself holding very large sums on deposit, and most still 
do so to this day. Somewhat similar developments took place across the border in India. 
However in this case Jullundur District was already better provided with Banks than was 
Mirpur, and a much higher proportion of the remittance inflow was invested either in house 
construction and the purchase of agricultural land and machinery. Hence whilst the total 
inflow of remittances into Jullundur was on a similar scale to that in Mirpur, a much smaller 
amount was left on deposit in the local banks. 
4.3.2 The scale of remittance flows – whether they were channelled through hawala or the 
formal banking sector – has also varied very considerably over time. During the initial phase 
of all-male settlement, sojourners saved as much as three-quarters of their wages; but when 
they brought their families to join them, their propensity to save – and hence to remit – 
dropped sharply. Moreover the speed with which the transition to family reunion took place 
varied from community to community. For reasons which need not concern us here, the 
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Jullunduri Sikhs began to move towards family reunion in the early 1960’s, whilst their 
Pakistani (and especially their Mirpuri) counterparts only began to do so in the mid-1970’s, 
just as they also began to be hit by financial disaster – the sudden collapse in the demand for 
labour in the heavy engineering and textile industries during the closing years of the 1970s. 
The combined impact of family reunion and high rates of unemployment meant that the 
Jullunduris, and rather later on the Mirpuris’ propensity to remit funds back home suddenly 
dropped very sharply. This trend was further reinforced a result of the insurrection in Indian 
Punjab which followed the Indian Army’s disastrously ill-conceived assault on the Golden 
Temple in 1984. I recall having a lengthy conversation with a Sikh luxury car dealer in Leeds 
in 1985 in which he told me that business had never been better as a result of the troubles in 
Punjab: no-one was investing back home any more.  
4.4 The revival of remittance outflows from the UK, and the use of hawala in the 1990s 
4.4.1 As the 1990s progressed, however, the outflow to Jullundur began to pick up again. 
Once Punjab’s troubles were over in 1993/4, a growing number of British based settlers 
rather gingerly began to implement their plans to build a new house for themselves and their 
families back home; even so the level of remittances never returned to anything like the 
levels which they had achieved prior to the cut-off in 1984.  
4.4.2 However Mirpuri settlers from Pakistan followed a rather different course. Although 
the demand for labour in heavy engineering and textiles never picked up again, settlers from 
Pakistan began to exploit all sorts of new niches in the labour market: small business 
enterprises such as shops, take-aways, and taxi-driving were much favoured. Not only did 
this mean that large numbers of younger people came ‘on-stream’ as income earners (very 
few Pakistani families contain less than two sons), but an ever-increasing number of those in 
the older generation began to reach retirement age. As this occurred, many of them felt that 
they were at long last in a position to implement a long-cherished dream: to build a splendid 
new house back home in their villages of origin, and thereby publicly celebrate their 
achievements overseas.  
4.4.3 Not only did long established settlers therefore begin to send substantial sums of 
money back to Pakistan to satisfy their construction dreams, but further sums were frequently 
dispatched as settlers took their families back home for extended visits, most often either to 
celebrate marriages or attend funerals (the majority of Pakistanis who pass away in Britain 
are still buried back in their home villages). To cut a long story short, linkages between 
Pakistani settlers in Britain and their home villages back in Pakistan remained as intense as 
ever. Hence as the Mirpuri/Pakistani community grew steadily more prosperous during the 
course of the 1990s, there was an even sharper escalation in the volume of funds being sent 
back from Britain to Pakistan.  
4.5 The changing character of local economies in high-emigrant areas 
4.5.1 The arrival of this new wave of remittances from Britain after the dip during the 
1980s had far reaching consequences for the local economies of those relatively small areas 
of Pakistan from which the majority of UK settlers were drawn. When I made my first 
detailed study of the impact of remittances on Mirpur’s local economy in the mid 1980s, I 
reached some extremely gloomy conclusions about the region’s long-term economic future. 
Although those who had stayed behind (for by the nearly 50% of the population of many 
villages had already moved to Britain) were in many ways much wealthier than those in 
nearby areas from which mass migration to the UK had not taken place, the local economy 
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had nevertheless become locked into what is best described as a condition of comprehensive 
economic dependency. During the previous decade there had been a massive inflow of funds 
from the UK, which had transformed the physical environment of Mirpur District, the area in 
which I conducted the greater part of my research. Most strikingly, virtually all the old-style 
adobe houses had been swept away to be replaced with spanking new brick, steel and 
concrete constructions. This building boom had also set off a parallel boom in all sorts of 
other areas of the local economy, including brick-making, and the sale and transportation of 
all manner of other construction materials, including cement, steel reinforcing bars, doors, 
window-frames and so forth, as well as transport (often by camel) to deliver the materials to 
often-remote villages in this mountainous area. As a result all the local bazaars had expanded 
rapidly to accommodate the new trade.  
4.5.2 However what was equally striking that very little of the massive inflow of capital 
resources which generated this boom had gone into improving levels of agricultural 
production. Hence even though agriculture was the mainstay of the real local economy – as 
opposed to that part of it which was driven by remittances from overseas – the profits and 
wages available in that sector were so great that agriculture went into serious decline. After 
all there was now plenty of money available to buy in wheat from elsewhere in Pakistan. For 
Mirpur to have moved into this condition of dependency would not have mattered one whit if 
migrant remittances had continued on the same ever-escalating path as they did in the 1970s. 
But that was not what happened, and by the mid 1980s the consequences were plain to see. 
The construction boom had come to a sharp end, and the bazaars were filled with hundreds of 
now-untenanted shop units. Many houses were locked up and gently decaying in the tropical 
climate. And since little or none of the remittance inflow had been invested in productive 
areas such as agriculture, the future of Mirpur’s local economy did not look bright. 
4.5.3 But when I returned a subsequent research visit three years ago, it was clear that a 
further transformation had taken place. The volume of remittances had not only picked up 
once again, but had begun to flow in on an even larger scale than they had during the 1970s. 
Once again the local environment was being transformed by a building boom – this time by 
the demolition of the now old-fashioned houses which had been built in the 1970s, in favour 
of spectacular multi-storied modern palaces. Likewise many of the bazaars were thriving 
once again, thanks to the presence of large numbers of free spending (at least in local terms) 
visitors from the UK. Although it was impossible to make an accurate assessment of just how 
much money was now flowing into Mirpur’s local economy from the UK, it was quite clear 
that the flow was running at tens of millions, and perhaps even hundreds of millions of 
pounds per annum.  
4.6 Changes in the international convertibility of Pakistani rupee 
4.6.1 Over and above the local British factors discussed above, developments within 
Pakistan have also encouraged this inflow. As the scale of the remittance outflows from the 
UK to Pakistan began to rise sharply once again during the course of the 19990s, hawala has 
come back into increasing favour as the preferred means of transferring funds back home. In 
part this has been an outcome of the factors cited earlier – ease, speed, reliability and so forth 
– but in the past few years another factor has come further and further to the fore: the 
substantial (although constantly varying) gap between the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ rates of 
exchange of the Pakistani rupee.  
4.6.2 Like many other third-world countries, the Government of Pakistan has long sought to 
control the outflow of rupees, and their conversion into foreign exchange, by restricting the 
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convertibility of its currency. That was regarded as an effective means of lessening – 
although certainly not of eliminating – Pakistan’s chronic trade deficit. However in recent 
years the IMF has put those countries to whom it offered support – and Pakistan is a massive 
borrower from this source – under ever more intense pressure to liberalise its economy, and 
hence, amongst other things, to remove all restrictions on the convertibility of its currency. At 
the beginning of the 1990’s the Government of Pakistan complied with those demands, 
although in an effort to control the expected foreign exchange haemorrhage, the State Bank 
of Pakistan was instructed to issue no questions asked US$-denominated bonds with a 
coupon considerably higher than international rates which were available to all Pakistani 
citizens whether resident at home and abroad, and which were repayable either in rupees or in 
US$ on demand. The bonds proved attractive: many millions of dollars of deposits were 
drawn in on this basis, and the foreign exchange deficit was thereby considerably eased.  
4.6.3 However all this changed in the aftermath of overt nuclear competition between India 
and Pakistan during the summer of 1998. In an effort to contain the prospect of further 
nuclear testing – let alone of outright war – the United States imposed severe economic 
sanctions on both parties. The USAID program was sharply cut back, and it was made quite 
clear that IMF loans were no longer available. In the absence of any guarantees the Pakistani 
currency began to sink like a stone, and having effectively made the rupee freely convertible 
only a few years before, exchange controls were once again imposed. Much more painfully – 
at least as far as the purchasers of the dollar denominated bonds were concerned – it was 
announced that these were to be re-denominated in rupees, such that the funds effectively 
became non-repatriable. The result was predictable: a wide gap opened between the official 
and the unofficial rates of exchange of for the Pakistani rupee.  
4.6.4 But just how was that exchange to be conducted. An additional feature of the 
liberalisation process which had taken place earlier was the introduction of further 
competition for the established banks, since provision was made to bring exchange dealers 
off the backstreets. Instead they could now apply for a license to carry out their trade from the 
State Bank of Pakistan, and once approved, could freely operate what would be described as 
bureaux de change in a UK context. A substantial number of dealers in foreign exchange 
gained licenses under the new rules, but whilst the rupee remained freely convertible they 
could only compete with the banks in terms of ease and speed of service. However the 
removal of the convertibility of the rupee changed all that: the hawala operations in which 
most of the licensed foreign exchange dealers participated enabled them to deliver almost 
unlimited quantities of rupees to Pakistan based recipients in exchange for hard currency 
deposits elsewhere, and at rates considerably higher than that which the banks had no 
alternative but to offer. Hence it was little wonder that when I visited Pakistan to conduct 
fieldwork in the spring of 2000, I found that virtually all the remittances arriving in Pakistan 
from Britain were being channelled through these licensed money changers rather than the 
banks. Hawala had come to dominate this section of the money transmission market. 
5 The organisation of hawala in a British Context  
5.1 The growth of South Asian ethnic colonies in the UK 
Although most members of Britain’s Indian and Pakistani population have now been resident 
in the UK for long enough to be fully conversant with English ways, not least because they 
constantly participate in English social arenas whilst at school, at work, and in all manner of 
commercial and leisure contexts, once one explores their behaviour in more personal and 
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domestic arenas it is immediately apparent that the great majority continue to organise their 
interactions with each other in terms of cultural, moral and linguistic conventions which are 
primarily inspired by their South Asian ancestral heritage. Once the existence of these 
multicultural capabilities have been acknowledged, it becomes easy to comprehend the way 
in which contemporary hawala operations are conducted within an alternative world: namely 
the moral and cultural conventions routinely deployed within local ethnic colonies South 
Asian settlers (and indeed many other minority groups) have constructed around themselves, 
rather than in terms of those current within the wider English society within which those 
colonies are set. Hence if we are to begin appreciate the ways in which Hawala currently 
operates, we must first take cognisance of these alternative cultural conventions. With this in 
mind it is worth making a number of points:  
5.2 The settlers’ propensity to save  
5.2.1 Since they first began to arrive in Britain, the great majority of South Asian settlers 
have displayed very frugal habits: above all they have remained committed to maximising 
their incomes and minimising expenditure in every conceivable sphere. In doing so they have 
avoided buying anything on credit like the plague, and have instead displayed an immense 
capacity to save, no matter how meagre their incomes may have been. It is also worth 
remembering that at least as far as almost everyone who was born and brought up in South 
Asia was concerned, the purposes of saving was to support – and to develop the financial 
prospects of – their entire extended family.  
5.2.2 However there was often a considerable gap between putting those savings together in 
dribs and drabs, and the point at which they were actually made use of, whether in the UK or 
– as many of the early settlers had long planned – sent back to South Asia to finance a major 
project such as buying land or constructing a new house. Where, though were their savings to 
be kept in the interim? Although virtually all South Asians in Britain now have accounts with 
banks and building societies, they nevertheless display a strong tendency to use those 
accounts as safe deposits in which to squirrel away funds against an eventual rainy day. 
However my experience also suggests that very few keep all their savings in the bank: 
instead almost everyone stands at the centre of a vast network of loans, which are either 
contracted with their kinsfolk, or failing that between friends and associates who have known 
each other for so long that they treat each other as if they were kin.  
5.3 Savings and Loans 
5.3.1 All South Asian communities support a wide range of credit raising mechanisms. 
Some of these are more or less formalised, as in the case of kommittis, rotating credit 
associations usually organised and run by women. Every member puts a similar sum 
(anywhere between £5 and £50, depending on the wealth of those involved) into the 
collective pot each week, which each member takes turns to withdraw: in a large committee, 
each weekly pot may well contain several thousand pounds.  Loans given on a more 
individualistic basis, whether to help kinsfolk over an exceptionally rocky patch, or to help to 
provide them with the working capital to set up a new business enterprise of one sort or 
another. Such loans are invariably made in cash, and are rarely, if ever, recorded on paper. 
Nor is the term of the loan specified: instead it is understood that the money will be returned 
as and when the person who made the loan needs his or her money back.  
5.3.2 In Western terms all these activities might seem desperately unwise: substantial sums 
are loaned without any supporting evidence on paper, and the term of the loan is unspecified. 
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It should be a fraudster’s paradise. Yet it is not. Whilst a few such relationships inevitably go 
bad, the vast majority of loans are repaid as and when requested, and with no sign of dispute 
between the parties concerned, despite an absence of records and absolutely no security. How 
can this be? 
5.3.3 The answer is straightforward. Such transactions are conducted within networks of 
kinship reciprocity, and it is against those reciprocities which the loan is secured. There are 
many dimensions to these processes, but two key features are worth highlighting here. Firstly 
it is not just the person who receives the loan who is held to be responsible for the repayment 
of the loan, but also all the other members of that person’s extend family, of which he or she 
is regarded as being an integral part. Secondly the sanctions against failing to fulfil ones 
obligations within the extended family as well as the wider kinship network are extremely 
severe, for the miscreant will promptly find himself cut off from all forms of reciprocity, so 
much so that he effectively ceases to be a member of the community and all its internal 
support networks. Such sanctions fall on the entire extended family of the defaulter – who 
may well repay the loan in his or her stead. Failing that the only way out is either for the 
whole family who takes its medicine, and suffer comprehensive exclusion for the community, 
or for the entire family to exclude the defaulter, so much so that they not only refuse to have 
anything to do with their offspring, but deny their very existence. Such sanctions are 
relatively rarely applied: their consequences are so severe that potential defaulters are 
normally brought to heel long before this fearful ultimate sanction is applied.  
5.3.4 It is also worth noting that non-kinsfolk are regularly incorporated into such networks 
though conventions of quasi-kinship. In South Asian contexts friendship is rapidly 
transmuted into fictive kinship, partly at a terminological level – so friends and associates 
swiftly begin to address one another as ‘brother’ – but also in more practical terms: they 
begin to invite each other to religious celebrations and family ritual, and begin to engage in 
complex patterns of gift exchange, does as real kin do. Although quasi-kinship is by 
definition a matter of choice rather than of blood, quasi-kinship ties can easily become just as 
all embracing as ties of real kinship, particularly when the alliance is to the partner’s mutual 
benefit.  
5.4 The role of cash 
5.4.1 However a further feature of all this is that almost all financial transactions between 
South Asian themselves, and especially the making and repayment of loans, are normally 
conducted in cash. Moreover all major purchases, whether they be of consumer goods such as 
televisions and cars, of tickets for flights back to Pakistan, or even of buying houses, are 
likewise regularly made in a  cash. The same is true of remittances to Pakistan. It is easy to 
see why. Not only are older and less qualified people (who are particularly likely to adhere to 
these traditional values and methods) particularly likely to wish to remit large sums of money 
to Pakistan with which to build houses, but such people also have a strong propensity to make 
loans to their kinsmen, rather than to leave their savings sitting idly in the bank. Hence 
someone setting off for Pakistan will very often call in all his or her extant loans – which will 
of course be repaid in cash – shortly before setting off abroad.  
5.5 The cultural context Hawala  
5.5.1 All hawala operations are conducted within a similarly-structured cultural context. 
The most specific sense in which this is so is with respect to the issue of trust, not least 
because unlimited trust in each other’s bona fides is a fundamental prerequisite for the 
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operation of the back-to-back exchange of debts between two spatially separated partners 
operating in tandem. Only then can both be confident that neither will betray the other by 
diverting the very substantial sums which each owes the other at any given point in time into 
their own pockets. It is for precisely this reason that Hawala operators are usually close kin – 
or at least have such a close and long-standing relationship that they treat each other as if they 
were kin. Likewise the circle of customers to which Hawala operators offer their services are 
normally drawn from a single community to which they themselves also belong. As such they 
and their customers are members of a wider network of quasi-kinship reciprocities in which 
everyone ultimately has connections with everyone else, with the result that if anyone acts in 
a way which betray the trust which others in the network have in him or her, the whole 
network is likely to close ranks against the miscreant, leaving him or her unable to operate as 
a network member. Since this is a very powerful sanction, it is also an extremely effective 
source of security. 
5.5.2 Such networks of trust are crucial to the operation of all levels of the hawala system. 
Once one can take the existence of trust for granted, it becomes much more explicable as to 
why customers should walk straight in off the street and entrust large sums of money to a 
hawaladar whom they hardly know. Both the hawaladar and his customers are well aware 
that if the operator were ever to cheat his customers, he would not only find himself out of 
business, but he would also have the whole of his community down on his back.  
5.6 Record keeping 
5.6.1 However just because the security which underpins hawala transactions arises from 
the close knit networks of reciprocity between those involved, rather than the bureaucratic 
procedures routinely utilised by more formally organised banking systems, it would be quite 
wrong to conclude that these processes are untouched by the competitive dynamics of 
commerce, or that they operate without any kind of formal record keeping. Far from it. Every 
South Asian community in Britain is filled with entrepreneurs keeping a sharp eye open for 
potential sources of profit, with the result that anyone who opens a successful business of any 
kind can soon expect rivals to open a similar business somewhere just down the road; and as 
ever, customers are driven quite as much by considerations of price as they are by those of 
personal loyalty – with the result that all such businesses are under constant pressure from 
their customers to offer a discount, and hence shave their margins still further. But reduced 
levels of prices not only means lower margins, but also reduced levels of overall profitability.  
5.6.2 By the same token, no hawala system can operate in the absence of extensive records, 
most particularly of the precise amount of the funds to be delivered to a particular person at 
an equally distant destination – all of which must be accurately delivered to the person 
operating the other arm of the hawala, and who is responsible for making the deliveries. 
Likewise the local hawaladar will regularly receive instructions from his partners elsewhere 
indicating just where and to whom he should deliver the currency he has received from his 
customers. Technology steps in here. Whilst old-style hawala relied on written promissory 
notes to convey such information, communication in the contemporary world is conducted by 
fax.  
5.6.3 Whilst these faxes provide the clearest possible audit trail of the operations of any 
hawaladar  (and as far as I am aware all hawaladars carefully preserve copies of all these 
faxes) it is also worth noting that one of the central consequences of the unlimited trust which 
underpins all these networks is that such records are effectively ordered on a ‘need to know 
basis’; insofar as any given hawala network normally includes a plurality of hawaladars (as 
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spelled out in Section 6.2 below), it follows that any given hawaladars records will only 
cover those transactions (both inwards and outwards) which have passed through his node in 
the system, rather than the totality of transaction in the system as a whole. Hence his lack of 
records of, and indeed his ignorance of, the details of all the multitude of transactions which 
have taken place elsewhere in the system of which his node is but a small component part 
should not, therefore, be regarded as evidence of any kind of malfeasance: rather it is a 
wholly predictable consequence of the way in which hawala systems are organised.  
6 The day to day operation of Hawala in the UK 
6.1  The spatial organisation of hawala 
6.1.1 How, though, does hawala operate in practice? Within all South Asian settlements of 
any size anywhere in the UK, specialist travel agents can invariably found doing very active 
business. Such agents not only sell cut-price tickets to South Asian destinations, but also offer 
a money-delivery service – or in other words hawala facilities to members of the local 
population. However only the very smallest of settlements only boasts one such agent; almost 
all have several. Mutual competition ensures that the costs to customers are cut to the lowest 
level which is still compatible with commercial viability.  
6.1.2 It is also worth highlighting the sheer scale of the population whom these Hawala 
outlets serve. In 1991 (the last year for which Census figures are currently available) Britain’s 
Pakistani population was already 475,000 strong, whilst its Indian population had reached 
834,000: however the size of this population is still rising rapidly, and when the 2001 figures 
are published later this year, total numbers will almost certainly be substantially larger. It is 
also worth highlighting their geographical distribution. Not only have Pakistanis settled in 
large numbers in the textile towns on both sides of the Pennines, but they are also heavily 
represented in engineering centres in the Midlands (and most especially in Birmingham), in 
various parts of London, as well as in a variety of towns around London such a Luton, 
Reading and Slough. Within that pattern there are yet further concentrations, such that 
migrants from Mirpur District in Azad Kashmir – who currently make up well over 50% of 
the Pakistani population in Britain – are particularly heavily concentrated in the Midlands and 
the Pennine region, and with their epicentres in Birmingham and Bradford.  
6.2 Agents, sub-agents and sub-sub-agents 
6.2.1 Just as only a privileged few travel agencies have direct links with airlines such as 
PIA, Emirates, Air India and so forth such that they can issue tickets directly on their behalf, 
whilst all the rest are in effect sub-agencies who use the services of the more central agencies 
in return for a small percentage fee, so only a similarly small minority of hawaladars occupy 
the same position of privilege within the hawala system. Those latter persons – who are best 
described as agents as opposed to sub-agents – can be distinguished by their access to a 
foreign currency bank account of their own, through which hawala funds which have been 
collected from customers in Britain are finally routed overseas in US$, the international 
medium of currency transmission and exchange.  
6.2.2 As every holiday-maker is aware, bank charges for converting small amounts of 
money from one currency into another are far from insignificant. If the actual transmission of 
funds from one country to another is also required, the charges are considerably steeper still.  
However the larger the sums of money involved, especially when they reach hundreds of 
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thousands of pounds, the smaller the percentage charged by way of commission becomes. 
Hence those agents who have been granted the facilities of a foreign currency accounts are 
not only in a position to become full scale hawala agents on their own account, but also to act 
as patrons to a substantial number of smaller scale operators who become their sub-agents, 
who route their transactions through the main agent in return, once again, for a small 
percentage fee. Hence one of the secrets of the success of major UK-based hawaladars lies in 
their capacity to gross up large quantities of foreign exchange, and thereby to sharply reduce 
the scale of bank charges associated with moving the funds overseas.  
6.3 Retail and wholesale hawala 
6.3.1 As one might expect, most of the high-level hawala operators are based in cities with 
a major South Asian presence such as Birmingham and Bradford; each also supports a large 
network of sub-agents and sub-sub-agents, some of whom will be based in the same city, but 
many of whom are scattered round settlements across the length and breadth of the UK, who 
use the high-level operator as a conduit through which to move their customers’ funds 
overseas. In a further complexity, these sub-agents may be of two types: 
i) those who simply collect funds from ‘off-the-street’ customers, whose details they 
pass on to the higher level hawaladar to be incorporated in the list of transactions 
stemming form his own ‘off-the street’ customers 
ii) those who have their own relationships with overseas partners, and who use the 
higher-level hawaladar’s facilities solely as a means of converting cash into 
dollars. 
6.3.2 This distinction has a significant impact on the records which the higher-level 
hawaladar keeps. In the first case he will receive bulked up cash from his lower-level agent, 
together with detailed instructions as to exactly how much should be paid to whom in 
Pakistan; these details will normally be faxed onwards to his partner hawaladar overseas. All 
such transactions can usefully be classified as retail hawala.  
6.3.3 However in the second case the sub-agent will conduct the retail dimension of the 
transaction independently: i.e. he will himself fax the details overseas. In these circumstances 
the higher-level hawaladar will once again receive bulked up cash (usually on a considerably 
larger scale, since such sub-agents may well have their own sub-sub-agents), instructions as 
to where the money should be sent overseas once converted into dollars, but with no 
indication as to where or too whom rupee payments should be made, since the sub-agent had 
looked after that part of the deal himself. Such transactions can usefully be identified as 
wholesale hawala.  
6.4 Corporate hawala 
6.4.1 Last but not least there is also a further category of transactions which I have not 
explicitly mentioned so far: those which emanate not so much from individual persons or 
families moving financial assets back to the sub-continent, but those where business 
enterprises are using the system to settle their debts to overseas suppliers. Typically this 
would involve Asian clothing wholesalers operating cash-and-carry businesses in cities such 
as Leeds, Manchester and Leicester reimbursing their suppliers who made up clothing to their 
orders in places such as China, the Philippines or Indonesia. Imports of made-up clothes – 
especially although by no means exclusively at the bottom end of the market – is now 
extremely big business in the UK, and much of it is controlled by South Asian (although 
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relatively rarely by Mirpuri) businessmen. Similarly there is a rapidly expanding market for 
all manner of other consumer goods, and most especially for electrical products and toys. 
Moreover wherever the distribution network is runs through Asian-controlled Cash and 
Carrys to Asian market stall holders – as the greater part of it does – all transactions are 
settled strictly in cash, no matter how delayed the settlement may be, given the inevitable 
presence of all manner of loans.  
6.4.2 At one level the logic of corporate and/or commercial hawala is very similar to that of 
wholesale hawala. By settling overseas invoices through a high-level hawaladar, such 
transactions attract a significantly lower level of overhead costs than if they were routed 
through the commercial banking system. Moreover this enabled such businesses to avert the 
considerable marginal costs associated with paying the large sums of cash which come into a 
cash-and-carry business into the bank, since most high-level hawaladars also negotiate 
significantly reduced rates for that service. Last but not least, many manufacturers based in 
soft-currency countries with stringent exchange controls also have a strong interest in having 
all or part of their invoices settled through informal systems; not only do they receive 
payment a great deal more quickly than would have been the case if passed through the 
formal commercial banking systems, but such manufacturers will very often have a strong 
interest in having their invoices settled in dollars, rather than the local currency (as would be 
the case if the settlement was made through the ‘overground’ banking system. Not only does 
IVTS enable them to keep reserves in dollar accounts (for at the end of the day most of these 
payments do end up in the formal banking system), but they will then also be much better 
placed to purchase raw materials from their suppliers, who are also likely to welcome being 
paid in dollar-denominated ‘flying money’, rather than non-negotiable renmenbi. Given the 
cut-throat competition between all those involved in these Far Eastern ‘emergent markets’, 
everyone is looking for the slightest advantage in an effort to get ahead: in these 
circumstances successful manufacturers and traders cannot be expected to eschew local forms 
of IVTS as a mode account settlement, especially when it offers positive financial margins as 
compared with the terms and conditions offered by the formal banking system. This is 
precisely the point of all Dr. Wilson’s arguments.  
6.5 Records and record keeping 
6.5.1 Much of the critical literature on hawala, and especially that produced by excited 
authors who suggest that hawala in necessarily a cover-up for criminal activity, suggests that 
hawaladars do not keep records, and therefore leave no audit trail as a deliberate means of 
covering up their malfeasance. In my own opinion all three of the major elements of this 
argument are unsound. 
6.5.2 In the first place my own experience suggests – as I indicated earlier – that all 
hawaladars do keep records, and that despite the excellent memories that many of them 
develop, the transactions soon begin to reach such a level of scale and complexity that some 
kind of formal record keeping is essential if they not to do a disservice to their customers. 
However the records which each member of the hawala chain keeps (and is interested in 
keeping) are tightly circumscribed. No-one is greatly interested in exactly where their 
partners got their money from: that is their business; similarly no-one is greatly interested in 
how those funds are passed on once they reach their assigned destination: all that matter is 
that they get there. It therefore follows the amount of information which hawaladars will have 
immediately to hand with respect to the transactions which pass through their node in the 
system will vary considerably depending on their precise location in the network, as well the 
category of transaction at hand.  
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6.5.3 In general it is over-the counter retail hawaladars in the UK whose records will be 
most detailed, at least with respect to the precise amount of funds which is to be paid over to 
individual recipients in specific locations in Pakistan. However as transactions are 
consolidated to an ever greater degree the further one moves up the scale from retail to 
wholesale to commercial and finally to global hawala, so reference to such fine detail 
progressively disappears. Indeed at the level of maximum consolidation – global hawala – the 
only information that the hawaladar will be likely to have to hand will be the size of the 
consolidated sum in millions of US$ to be transferred from one brokers account (where that 
broker is acting on behalf of a whole string of agents, sub-agents and sub-sub-agents) to 
another brokers account, where the second broker may well be acting on behalf of an equally 
complex web of recipients.  
6.5.4 Moreover the further one moves up the scale of consolidation, the less and less likely 
it will be that the hawaladar who arranges the deals will be permanently physically based in 
the UK. Instead is strategically far more appropriate for wholesale, and above all for global 
operators to locate themselves at the point where the larger scale consolidations are likely to 
take place: in the first instance that means Karachi, Bombay of Dhaka, and for those right at 
the top of the hierarchy, in Dubai. Once again it must be emphasised that  there is nothing 
intrinsically suspicious about the fact that from a UK perspective the larger scale hawaladars 
are invariably based overseas, or that the larger the scale of the transaction, the less detailed 
the information about either the original sources and the ultimate destinations of the funds in 
question will normally be. Just as foreign exchange brokers sit hunched over their screens in 
dealing rooms in London with a telephone to each ear as the deal in millions of dollars, the 
ever increasing anonymity of higher level transactions is an inherent characteristic of the way 
in which the contemporary global IVTS operates.  
6.6 A note on laundering the profits of drug smuggling 
6.6.1 It goes without saying that such large scale IVTS transactions could be used as 
umbrella under which to conceal (and hence launder) profits accrued from illegal trafficking 
in drugs; however it is just as easy for such transactions to be buried amongst those passing 
through the only other contemporary international value transfer system, that run by formally 
organised banks.  
6.6.2 However the issue at stake here is not so much whether hawala could in principle be 
used to launder the profits of drug smuggling, but whether it is currently being so used, and 
most especially whether money being laundered in this way actually accounted for a 
significant proportion of the funds which passed through the defendants’ hands. It is, of 
course, quite impossible to prove a negative. No financial institution of any size, whether 
formally or informally organised, could ever hope to produce proof positive that none of the 
funds passing through its hands had ever, at some point, passed through the hands of a drug 
smuggler. The best that any financial institution can do is to show that it has taken all relevant 
steps – given the nature of its business – to ensure that its facilities are not being used for 
such purposes. How, then, does Hawala/IVTS score in these terms? 
6.6.3 As we have seen records are not the issue. It is not so much that hawala operators 
keep no records, but rather that such records are kept on a need-to-know basis, and are 
therefore widely spatially scattered. Secondly it is also worth noting that in purely financial 
terms, IVTS networks are extremely fragile. Such is the extent of competition between all the 
various players, all margins are cut to the bone, and no-one but the very largest consolidators 
makes much money. That does not exclude the possibility that some players may make a 
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good living out of hawala, but they do so by shaving ever narrower margins off ever more 
comprehensively consolidated financial transactions.  A margin of .01% may seem to be very 
measly, until one notes that this is regularly being taken off flows of tens of millions of US$.  
Then it is not to be sniffed at.  
6.6.4 However precisely because margins are so narrow, none of those involved can afford 
to make a mistake. Not only do all partners in the system need to trust each other, and 
therefore mutually guarantee their bona fides with respect to the transaction in hand, but they 
also need to ensure that no-one in the network will get the network into trouble – as 
inevitably occurs the moment one starts dealing in the profits of illegal activity, and most 
especially the proceeds of the most dangerous activity of all. Hence it is not just that drug 
smugglers can expect to find themselves paying much higher premiums, if indeed they can 
find anyone to accept their business at all, but also that active commercial hawaladars have a 
very strong interest in not getting involved in such dangerous business at all, and also 
ensuring that none of their associates do either, above all because that would bring the whole 
fragile edifice from which they nevertheless manage to extract a reasonable living down 
around their heads. Hence there is a very powerful sense in which hawala networks are – and 
indeed have to – internally self-policing if their long-term stability is to be ensured. 
6.6.5 In this respect Professor Passas’ comments on the issue are most significant. Having 
noted that hawaladars make their profits from currency exchange rates manipulation together 
with a commission ranging from 0.25-1.25% of the amount involved, he points out ( quoting 
Caroll 1999) that  
“When the hawaladar understands that the transaction involves criminal proceeds or 
transactions by the client, the charged commission may go up to 15-20 percent” 
(Passas 1999: 14). 
6.6.6 This dramatically higher commission clearly reflects an assessment of the very much 
higher risks involved in engaging in such transactions. Moreover those risks have two quite 
different dimensions: firstly of being apprehended by the authorities, but of being found to 
have betrayed the confidence of other members of the hawala network, and thereby to have 
put all their business under threat as well. In my view errant hawaladars would be far more 
fearful of the sanctions emanating from the latter than the former source. Those who 
betraying the network of absolute trust know that they and all the immediate members of 
their family face comprehensive social and commercial ostracism.  
6.6.7 Finally it is also worth addressing a specific issue at stake in these proceedings: the 
fact that some of the cash which the defendants deposited were found to be disproportionately 
contaminated with traces Class A drugs. Whilst I am not in a position to comment on the 
issue of contamination per se, it is nevertheless worth noting that if virtually all this cash was 
derived in one way or another from the legitimately acquired funds of a South Asian 
clientele, as the Defence contends, this is precisely the outcome which one would expect. Not 
only are members of Britain’s disproportionately concentrated – at least in residential terms – 
in inner-city areas, but a most of their business customers, whether in innumerable Asian 
corner shops, curry houses and taxi ranks, or of the market traders who buy their supplies in 
Asian-owned cash and carry warehouses, will be members of poor white working-class 
communities living in inner-city areas. This is, of course, precisely the kind of population 
which is likely to contain a disproportionate number of users of Class A drugs. If so it follows 
that the currency notes which pass through its members' hands – and which they in turn used 
to make purchases on a wholly legitimate basis from Asian shopkeepers, taxi drivers and 
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market stallholders – are particularly likely to be contaminated with the residue of class A 
drugs. This raises major evidential issues. Precisely because of the particular niche in the 
British economy currently occupied by South Asians in general, and Pakistanis in particular, 
it is only to be expected that a high proportion of the currency notes which they receive from 
their customers, and which in good time they pass on to hawaladars for value transmission 
overseas, will have spent a disproportionate period of time circulating in inner-city areas – or 
in other words in arenas where contamination is particularly likely to occur.  
6.6.8 Two points follow from this. Firstly hawala operators have very good reasons for 
avoiding any kind of association with drugs traffickers, and for cutting all those whom they 
suspect of seeking to engage in such transactions out of their network; secondly given that 
there is good reason to assume that the greater part of the currency notes which Pakistani 
remitters deposit with frontline hawaladars will have circulated for some time in inner city 
areas, those notes are disproportionately likely to be contaminated with  Class A drugs.  
7 Hawala in South Asia  
7.1 The contemporary context  
7.1.1 Given the huge scale of emigration from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka to 
a wide variety of destinations right across the globe, migrant remittances play a large part of 
in the national economy of all four of these South Asian countries, and even more so in the 
local economy of those very much smaller areas from which particularly large numbers of 
migrants have set off overseas. Hawala has long played a salient role in facilitating these 
transfers, not least because in the aftermath of Independence in 1947 all of the successor 
Governments followed Britain’s example by imposing strict exchange controls in an effort to 
maintain their scarce reserves of foreign exchange. In these circumstances it was extremely 
difficult for residents in any of these South Asian countries to get permission to switch their 
‘soft’ rupees into hard currencies such as US dollars and pounds sterling. Because the 
demand for hard currency hugely exceeded supply, a considerable discrepancy rapidly 
opened up between the official and ‘unofficial’ rate of exchange. This opened up major 
opportunities for hawaladars, most especially when mass migration to the UK, and then to the 
Gulf, began to take off in the 1950s and 60s.  
7.1.2 As ever, it is virtually impossible to measure the actual scale of such ‘unofficial’ 
transactions. However given the scale of emigration from the region (which can be measured 
in millions for each country), and the fact that the great majority of upper-middle class 
families throughout the region now have substantial (unofficial) hard currency holdings in 
overseas banks, there can be little doubt that hawala/IVTS ‘swaps’ played a major role in 
facilitating this outcome – and that throughout the region that process continues to this day. 
The reasons why all this occurred are precisely those set out by Dr. Wilson. Over and above 
the swiftness and efficiency with which hawala transactions could be executed, a further 
attraction – particularly to those wishing to buy rupees with harder currency – was the 
premium on the ‘official’ rate which they could very often obtain. The scale of that premium 
was, of course, largely determined by the scale of ‘unofficial’ demand for harder currency by 
rupee holders, as well as on how realistically the ‘official’ rate of exchange was pitched – just 
as Dr. Wilson argues. However at this level we find considerable differences between the two 
countries. 
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7.1.3 Although India exercised strict controls on the export of financial resources for very 
much longer than has Pakistan, in recent years India’s economy has proved to be very much 
more robust than that of its neighbour and rival. As a result the constraints embodied in the 
FERA regulations have been steadily relaxed, even though they have still not yet been wholly 
abolished. By contrast Pakistan has not only run a very much larger foreign exchange deficit 
than India, so much so that its total foreign debt is currently more than US$ 40 billion, for the 
late 1980s onwards it found itself under much ever greater pressure from its principal 
creditor, the IMF, to de-regulate its economy. As a result all restrictions on the convertibility 
of the Pakistani rupee were abandoned in the early 1990s. However in an effort to replenish 
its foreign exchange reserves, the State Bank of Pakistan advertised the availability of bearer 
bonds denominated in US$, carrying a very much higher rate of interest than similar bonds 
issued in London or New York, which were made available to Pakistani citizens on a no-
questions-asked basis. Although the ‘no questions asked’ dimension of this bond issue caused 
some concern to the regulatory authorities in New York, the operation proved successful. The 
State Bank of Pakistan was soon gathered sufficient deposits to boost its foreign exchange 
reserves by several hundred million dollars.  
7.1.4 Meanwhile a parallel and much less noticed change in Pakistan’s Banking rules was 
also introduced. Hitherto dealing in foreign exchange had hitherto been a monopoly of 
formally constituted banks, and now this restriction was also removed. Having paid a 
relatively small fee to the State bank, a permit to operate as a licensed money changer could 
be obtained on a relatively straightforward basis. Although the new regulations facilitated the 
operation of hawala, since they provided a set of ‘over-ground’ legal conventions within 
which to operate, the system also lost one of its crucial advantages vis-à-vis as a result of the 
free convertibility of the rupee. Since the new rules entirely eliminated the possibility of an 
‘unofficial’ rate of exchange, hawaladars could no longer offer premium rates of exchange. 
Hence the only way in which licensed money changers (most of whom also operated as 
hawaladars) could compete with the banks was either by responding to their customers’ needs 
with greater speed and flexibility, or their greater physical closeness to them. Hence the 
money changers who achieved greatest success in the immediate aftermath of the 
introduction of the new rules were those operating in relatively remote rural areas from which 
a large proportion of overseas migrants were drawn, and who could therefore make the most 
of these potentialities. 
7.2 Nuclear testing and its consequences 
7.2.1 Whilst the new regulations effectively meant that hawala transactions, together with 
the institutional structures needed to facilitate their operation have now been open, legal and 
wholly above board in Pakistan for a full decade, the whole system received a huge – if 
unexpected – boost following the tit-for-tat testing of atomic weapons by both India and 
Pakistan in 1998. All sections of the International Community – led by the United States – 
promptly imposed severe financial sanctions on both India and Pakistan. Given that its 
internal economy is a great deal more robust than that of Pakistan, India withstood the impact 
of these sanctions without too much difficulty. However Pakistan found itself in much more 
serious difficulties. There was promptly a severe run on the rupee, which the authorities had 
no means of stemming as long as the currency remained freely convertible. There was only 
one way out: exchange controls were promptly re-imposed. However precisely because the 
bearer bonds had been issued to boost the country’s foreign exchange reserves, they were 
also caught in the net.  Not only did the State Bank renege on its promise to repay to repay 
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deposits in US$, but it re-denominated them in rupees which were in principle at least, non-
negotiable onto harder currency units.  
7.2.2 As was only to be expected these developments opened up a wide gap – initially as 
much as 20% – between the official and the unofficial value of the rupee: although the bearer 
bonds had nominally been sold to Pakistani depositors on a ‘patriotic’ basis, it soon became 
clear that high and guaranteed interest rates and ensured convertibility were far more 
important than patriotism. Fearing that the value of the Rupee would drop still further – as 
indeed it has – many depositors promptly began to look for a means of moving their funds to 
safer havens overseas. Moreover there was a ready means of doing so: although the 
Government of Pakistan rescinded the convertibility of the rupee, it had introduced no 
restrictions on the activities of the licensed money changers. 
7.2.3 The outcome was predictable. Whilst Karachi (and New York) was full of unhappy 
bond holders eager to cut their losses by moving their now-depleted savings overseas before 
their value dropped still further, many more working-class migrants saw this as an ideal 
moment to repatriate the funds they held overseas to Pakistan, since the rate of exchange – 
especially in unofficial terms – was suddenly very much higher than ever before. Hawala 
thrived – and have continued to do so ever since. Those businesses which had already 
obtained licenses to operate as moneychangers rapidly extended the scale of their operations, 
and as opportunities expanded, many more entrepreneurs applied for, and received, licenses 
which enabled to fill more localised niches.  
7.3 The emergence of ‘official’ Hawala in Pakistan 
7.3.1 Even before the financial crises of the late 1990s, most of Pakistan’s licensed money 
changers had in fact been running hawala operations. They obtained foreign exchange (which 
was rarely actually brought to Pakistan) on behalf of wealthy Pakistani clients through swap 
arrangements with colleagues in the Gulf whose migrant worker clients wishes to send their 
hard-currency savings back to their families in Pakistan, where they expected payments to be 
made to their families in rupees. When the margin between the official and unofficial rates of 
exchange widened to 20% or more, as they did when the impact of nuclear testing was 
reinforced by General Musharraf’s coup d’etat, the licensed money changers stepped in with 
a vengeance. Pakistan’s more regularly constituted Banks lost the greater part of their foreign 
exchange business, which was promptly routed through hawala operations instead. Indeed 
during the past few years the ‘hawala market’ has become such a routine component of 
financial activities in Karachi that the State Bank of Pakistan now routinely turns to this 
source whenever it need urgently to top up its reserves of foreign exchange. 
7.3.2 At present there are a very large number of Licensed Currency dealers in Pakistan, the 
great majority of whom have only emerged during the last decade. However the largest 
businesses are now becoming extremely well organised, and as a result now have an internet 
presence.  
7.4 Retail (distributional) hawala in Pakistan 
7.4.1 Major licensed Foreign Exchange dealers in Pakistan are best described as wholesale 
hawaladars: they have direct links with the major exchanges in Dubai (described in detail in 
section 8), and sometimes with counterpart wholesale hawaladars in the UK. However to the 
extent that the great majority of hawala recipients in South Asia are based out in the 
countryside rather in its major cities, wholesale hawaladars (who invariably operate in major 
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conurbations) frequently turn to all manner of sub-agents (some of whom are also 
hawaladars) to distribute the funds to their eventual recipients. As described in the CD-ROM, 
careful arrangements have to be made to ensure that those responsible for delivering rupees 
are accurately informed by the sending hawaladar as to just how much should be paid to 
whom in which village: this is almost always done by fax. Always remembering that such 
information is transmitted from retailer to retailer (for it is of no interest or concern to 
wholesalers) such detailed customer information is invariably transmitted – and hence most 
usually recorded – in all cases where the hawala facilitates long-distance personal financial 
transactions. 
8 Global Hawala 
8.1 Hawala as a global system of value transfer 
8.1.1 So far my discussion has almost exclusively been concerned with localised 
manifestations of hawala in the UK on the one hand, and in South Asia on the other. 
However the key to the operation of these local transactions is that they are located within, 
and contribute substantially to, a global hawala system. Although the windows through which 
I myself have begun to examine this global system are located in my South Asian experience, 
I have gradually come to the same conclusion as both Professor Passas’ and Dr. Wilson’s 
view: that although Informal Value Transfer Systems may go by different names in different 
parts of the world, they now form a global network whose activities stretch into all seven 
continents. I would also suggest that its operation in any given locality cannot properly be 
understood unless its global reach is also taken fully into account. 
8.1.2 However it is also worth noting that the three of us have approached the issues from 
rather different perspectives. My own approach, as can be seen from the contents of this 
report so far, has been broadly anthropological in character: as such my exploration of hawala 
has been conducted from the bottom up, with a specific focus on the internal operation of 
transactions stretching between the UK on the one hand and South Asia on the other. By 
contrast Professor Passas is a criminologist by background, even though he eventually 
reached the conclusion that the widely held view that IVTS was primarily a vehicle for 
laundering the proceeds of criminal activity was overwhelmingly mistaken. Finally Dr. 
Wilson not only looks at the issues from a banker’s perspective, but is also particularly well 
informed about many of the local contexts within which hawala operates, since he is the 
senior Economist in the Middle Eastern Department of the IMF. In view of his undoubted 
expertise in this area, his remarks – even if delivered on an off-the-cuff basis in a Conference 
address, are nevertheless worth quoting in detail. 
8.2 Dr. Wilson’s paradigmatic models of hawala settlement processes 
8.2.1 The greater part of the second half of Dr. Wilson’s paper is concerned with exploring 
just how debts amongst hawala are operators are settled up, and with showing that the whole 
process is practice far more complex than the simple reciprocal deals envisaged by many 
commentators – Professor Passas included. On the issue of settlement, Dr. Wilson begins by 
stressing that   
It should be intuitively clear that it will be difficult and costly to settle, bilaterally, 
scads of positions among small operators on different continents. Thus, it is fairly 
well agreed that small balances are “consolidated” at one or more higher levels of the 
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hawala network; there are other intermediaries in the system. Hawaladar A settles his 
dollar balance due with a payment to some intermediary, probably but not necessarily 
one located in country A. Hawaladar B may collect his local currency claim from an 
intermediary, probably in country B. These intermediaries consolidate small positions 
into larger subtotals in fewer hands. Such entities …. are larger scale operators than 
the small scale hawaladar. (I would argue, parenthetically, these operators also should 
not be called hawaladars.) Where are such entities concentrated? We can’t tell for sure 
but, for various reasons Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, has often been singled 
out as a location where many hawala transactions are consolidated and cleared. There 
are 105 exchange houses in the U.A.E. ……. 
after the original remittance, there are a broad range of permutations and alternatives 
by which the downstream rebalancing can be settled. Eventually, some kind of 
settlement is inevitable; this can take place either through the goods markets (as with 
international trade) or, in some cases, financial markets. The number of possibilities is 
quite large, and depends on specific countries and institutional rules …. (Wilson 
2002: 10) 
8.2.2 In other words the moment the issue of settlement is addressed, together with the de 
facto recognition that contemporary hawala invariably involves consolidation, brokers at 
operating at various levels and in a variety of locations in transnational space, the whole 
system self-evidently becomes a great deal more complex than many journalistic 
commentators have hitherto assumed. Hence as Dr. Wilson goes on to argue 
Moving on some of the clearing and settlement alternatives that lie downstream from 
hawala remittances … is … an area in which common press reports about hawala tend 
to dissolve into verbal fog or they reach for implausible resolutions. For instance, 
simple, bilateral, reverse hawala—that is a symmetric set of remittances sent in the 
opposite direction through the same intermediaries [is] highly unlikely in the real 
world. Aggregate international remittance flows are, by their nature, very asymmetric. 
For instance, millions of Subcontinent workers in the Gulf countries clearly send large 
amounts home, but there is no obvious reverse flow to balance hawala markets. Other 
clearing mechanisms surely are more important. 
In some cases bilateral settlement through bank or financial accounts may be possible, 
but often this is not feasible, owing to exchange controls or other restrictions, usually 
in the recipient country B. In other words, Hawaladar A simply cannot pay into 
Hawaladar B’s account at home, not least because one side of the transaction is in 
dollars, and the other in B’s local currency. From the B side one of the attractions of 
Hawala (at least at the consolidated level) seems to be evading currency control 
regulations. “Currency control,” in quotes, usually means that if you get your hands 
on hard currency, the authorities will take it away from you and give you local 
currency instead, often at an unfavourable rate compared to out there on the street. 
Hawaladar B and his/her consolidator associates behind them will not be excited at 
this prospect. (Ibid: 6 - 7) 
8.2.3 Hence Dr. Wilson moves on to consider other possibilities: 
A third alternative for settlement runs through the goods market: exports from country 
A (or elsewhere) to country B, which can be paid for by the Hawala balances due 
between the parties. This can be a bilateral deal between the Hawaladars or, more 
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likely, at a higher level of consolidation. In other words, the Hawala remittance from 
country A to B enables and finances exports from A to B. In balance of payments 
terms, a current account remittance finances a current account export. It bears noting 
again that no foreign exchange transaction needs take place in such a scenario. Here 
the connection of a simple Hawala transaction to international trade and balance of 
payments begins to come into profile (ibid: 8)  
8.2.4 Beyond that there are yet further possibilities  
as to the other kinds of international transactions that our prototype Hawala 
remittance could eventually finance. It is often said—and we do not dispute—that 
Hawala remittances help finance purchases of international services, such as 
education, medical treatment, and so forth, by residents of country B. This can be in 
country A or elsewhere. Recall that a common feature in Hawala is that the currency 
of country A usually is convertible; so a deal done in Kuwaiti dinars in Kuwait 
through to rupees in India gives rise to balances that are eminently translatable into 
U.K. pounds sterling or U.S. dollars. Since the money is so fungible, little wonder that 
the so-called “audit trail” of all the possible variants becomes most elusive…. 
Hawala balances [can also] serve to finance asset purchases, ranging from real estate 
to financial instruments, outside of country B. This is the classic example of “capital 
flight,” usually supposed to occur in contravention of local exchange control 
regulations and sometimes branded as “economic sabotage” by national authorities. 
Note, however, the other economic and interpretative complexities that arise in such 
transactions sequences. It is possible in such cases that the ultimate purchaser of 
services or assets never actually purchases foreign exchange. Payment in country B 
can be made in local currency; the exchange rate against, say, the U.S. dollar remains 
entirely implicit in such transactions, and nothing goes, necessarily at least, through 
any financial institution.  
Finally, sometimes policy changes in a hawala country affect settlement choices. 
India has shifted course on foreign exchange regulations several times in the last 
decade. In the mid 1990s the authorities went over to a “no questions” policy 
concerning residents foreign exchange holdings and deposits made into their local 
bank accounts. Obviously, such a change immediately opens the possibility for simple 
financial settlement of hawala balances, and there is some evidence this indeed 
occurred. (ibid: 8 - 9) 
 
8.2.5 It is also worth noting that on the basis of this careful, balanced and well-informed 
analysis Dr. Wilson reaches some extremely important conclusions, most especially as far as 
the issues at stake in these proceedings are concerned:  
By its nature an Informal Funds Transfer System such as Hawala cannot be easily 
measured. The number and scale and final magnitude of Hawala transactions simply 
are not captured in any country’s compilation systems, for example, in balance of 
payments statistics, monetary accounts, or national income statistics. I don’t propose 
to go into technical aspects of these topics, but it is worth mentioning that the 
substantial literature on underground economic activity is not likely to be helpful in 
assessing the scale of Hawala. That is, if nothing else, because Hawala remittances 
have little to do with underground or illicit economic activity; they are generally an 
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informal, alternative channel to send remittances that could also be sent via licensed 
channels, but at greater cost and inconvenience. (ibid: 10) [Italics mine] 
8.2.6 With all this in mind let us now turn our attention to the specific issues thrown up in 
these proceedings, especially as far as the operation of hawala global is concerned.  
8.3 The role of Dubai and New York 
8.3.1 Once we turn our attention to the operation of hawala at global level, virtually all 
transactions are settled through the formally organised banking system. Indeed since 
individual transactions at this level (which are the hugely consolidated sum of innumerable 
lower-level hawala deals) frequently amount to millions or even tens of millions of dollars, 
there is no way in which value transfers of this scale can be made other than through the 
international bank system. It is also worth noting that in that arena, hawala settlements only 
constitute a very small fraction of the global flow of foreign exchange transactions, which I 
understand now run at around US$ 1 trillion per day. It is also worth noting that all 
transactions at this level are denoted in US$, whatever their original currencies of provenance 
such funds may have, since the US$ is the sole medium of exchange in contemporary global 
financial transactions. (The £ sterling occupied a similar position until shortly after the end if 
WW I)  
8.3.2 Whilst the deals which underpin these transactions may take place anywhere in the 
world (London is one of the most important centres for doing so), it is worth noting that the 
actual movement of funds between computers (for paper money plays no role whatsoever in 
transactions conducted at this level) is normally routed through New York. Hence the funds 
in virtually all hawala transactions touch base in New York (at least in an electronic sense) at 
some point in their career. 
8.3.3 But whilst London has remained a major centre for currency transactions of all kinds, 
despite the demise of sterling as the global unit of exchange) nothing is static. Hence it is now 
it is now becoming equally clear that Dubai (rather than London or New York) is emerging as 
one of the most important financial hubs in which transactions to support activities in South 
Asian – and possibly also in South East Asian – trading contexts. It is not difficult to see why 
this should have occurred, since Dubai is ideally placed to fulfil that role. In the first place it a 
small desert state with substantial oil reserves, although these are in fact relatively small as 
compared to those of most of its neighbours, suggesting that it would be unwise to rely on oil 
revenue alone to sustain its wealth. Nevertheless its proximity to big oil not only means that it 
has been able to peg the value of its currency permanently to the US$, but that it is well place 
to take strategic advantage of its location at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.  
8.3.4 Dubai has for many years been a convenient entrepôt for traders operating in and 
from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, who would undoubtedly 
have utilised hawala as a means of financing their activities in pre-modern times. However, 
Dubai’s ever-increasing importance as a regional trading ‘hub’ – a role which its government 
very actively fosters – has yet further reinforced the scale and importance of these 
transactions. Just as the ever-growing use of migrant labour throughout the region has been 
the foundation of the commercial success of Dubai-based Emirates Airlines – the core of 
whose business rests in ferrying such workers back and forth on a global scale – so the 
exponential growth in the scale of migrant remittances has similarly enabled Dubai to emerge 
as a major banking hub through which these funds are transmitted onwards to relevant 
destinations in South and Southeast Asia. Largely staffed by expatriate Indians and 
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Pakistanis, Dubai’s financial institutions now play a similar role in the entire Indian Ocean 
region as do those of London in Europe, New York in the Americas, and Hong Kong in East 
Asia.  
8.4 The ‘Exchanges’ in Dubai and their role a hub for global hawala 
8.4.1 Whilst Dubai is now a major banking centre in its own right, since over forty 
international banks have now established branches there, but also a hub for the settlement of 
large-scale hawala transactions. The crucial institution through which these transactions are 
organised is the UAE Exchange Centre, which forms the heart of Dubai’s money-exchange 
suq. Established in 1980 by an Dubai-based Indian businessman who has made a fortune 
from building a chain of private hospitals, the UAE exchange began life as a means of 
facilitating the repatriation of Malayali and Tamil migrants’ (of whom a large number work 
in the Gulf region) savings to their families in South India – doubtless on the basis of hawala 
transactions. Over the years the business grew steadily in size, taking a major step forward in 
1994 when the UAE Exchange Centre became a member of SWIFT. This is an extremely 
secure electronic communications system through which major international banks conduct 
transactions with one another. The availability of SWIFT facilities spurred yet further growth, 
especially when the UAE Exchange Centre set up a secure Local Area Network linking up all 
the other lower-level Exchanges doing business in the money suq.  The existence of this LAN 
not only gives all its participants’ direct access to the UAE Exchange’s SWIFT facilities, but 
also facilitates the resolution and settlement of hawala accounts on a global basis.  
8.4.2 That does not necessarily mean that the customers of all the Exchanges in Dubai are 
randomly distributed all around the globe: on the contrary most Exchanges appear to service 
a more or less specialist regional markets. Hence I have become particularly familiar with 
Multinet Trust Exchange, World Link Exchange, Wall Street Exchange, and Sajwani 
Express. All appear to specialise in Anglo-Pakistani transactions, with the result that most 
wholesale hawaladars operating in the British/ Pakistani market appear to do the bulk of their 
business with one or other of the businesses. However it is quite clear that hawala deals 
involving Pakistani migrants to Britain – or indeed to elsewhere in the Gulf region – by no 
means exhaust the scope of the deals which take place under the umbrella of UAE Exchange 
Centre. I have also been able to identify a number of similar businesses – Al Ahlia Exchange, 
Al Ansari Exchange, Al Fardan Exchange, Al Ghrurair Exchange, and Harib Sultan 
Exchange – which appear, amongst other things, to perform a similar role for the global 
Philipino diaspora.  
8.4.3 But just what is the role of the UAE Exchange, as well as the numerous smaller 
exchange businesses which operate under its umbrella? As far as I am able to determine the 
term ‘Exchange’ precisely identifies the function of the whole structure: it is a facility in 
which bilateral and multilateral exchanges of hawala debts involving hugely consolidated 
tranches of funds can be lined up and swapped on a global scale. In these circumstances the 
classic hawala pattern truly comes into its own: it facilitates processes of account resolution 
and settlement which are identical in structure and function to the deals which also take place 
as between formally constituted banks. So it is that whilst the deals made in Dubai may at one 
level appear to be quite different from the arrangements made by formally constituted banks, 
in the sense that trust is articulated on a personalised ‘oriental’ basis rather than through 
formalised bureaucratic procedures, it is nevertheless clear that they have an identical 
outcome, namely the ‘settlement of accounts’ in a banking sense. Likewise the 
implementation of both sets of deals is handled in an identical fashion – namely the SWIFT 
network, which is of course the ‘formally constituted’ Banks own preferred means of cross-
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jurisdictional settlement. Where they differ, however, is in the cost of the settlement process: 
it is far cheaper to effect global settlements through informal networks in the money Suq in 
Dubai than do so from an expensive office block in New York or London housing largely 
numbers of highly paid staff to implement the necessary bureaucratic procedures: it is 
precisely its efficiency in a financial sense which provides global hawala with its competitive 
edge.  
9 Corporate Hawala  
9.1.1 Once the Exchanges in Dubai (and in other parallel hubs in centres such a Hong-
Kong, for example) are identified as an active competitors with formally constituted banks 
for a piece of the action in the global settlement market, a great deal of what might otherwise 
be a confusing jigsaw falls into place.  Nevertheless one crucial element still requires 
identification. Although it is common ground that migrant remittances – which take the form 
of an extremely large transfer of value from hard-currency regions in the  developed world to 
soft-currency regions in Africa, Latin America and above all Southern and Eastern Asia – 
have driven the rapid expansion of IVTS during the last few decades, the system can only 
work if there is an equal and opposite outflow of value from soft currency areas into hard 
currency zones on the basis of which to organise settlement. What, then, is the principal 
source of this reverse flow of value?  
 
9.2 The role of corporate transactions in Hawala settlement 
9.2.1 Whilst a whole series of possible sources of such a counter-flow of value to match the 
remittance outflow currently emanating from Euro-America is set out in section 3.4 above, 
but given the enormous scale of that outflow, there are only a restricted number of sources 
from which counter-flows of a sufficient scale could credibly be generated:  
• the export of capital by members of indigenous elites in soft currency areas in order either 
to purchase property and other real assets in safe havens overseas, or to gain access to 
services such as medical treatment and education both for themselves or their offspring 
• the clearing of export/import invoices both for goods services imported from hard 
currency areas, and to finance inter-regional trade between producers, manufacturers and 
distributors in soft currency domains, all of which is settled in dollars.  
9.2.2  Since such deals invariably involve very large transfers of value, they are not 
normally conducted by individuals other than members of the tiny elite of super-rich 
kleptocrats who can be found in most very poor countries. Rather they are almost always 
conducted on a corporate basis – or in other words between business enterprises of one kind 
or another.  
9.2.3 Corporate hawala, where a commercial enterprise (typically an importer) uses the 
system to honour an invoice from another commercial enterprise (typically either a 
manufacturer or a producer of raw materials operating in some distant market), operates on a 
rather different basis from the migrant-remittance driven processes outlined in the previous 
sections. Firstly the sums involved in each deal can be expected to be very much larger – 
typically in tens and not infrequently hundreds of thousands of dollars; secondly each deal 
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can be expected to be tailor-made, and hence to involve a very much smaller number of 
agents and intermediaries. Thus whilst corporate hawala deals may still be routed through the 
Exchanges in Dubai, in such cases it may well only be staff members of the Exchanges 
themselves (mega-wholesalers as far as remittance-hawala is concerned) have direct dealings 
with the corporate customers who stand at one or other (and sometimes both) ends of the 
chain.  
9.2.4 But although there is good reason to suppose that the greater part of the funds used to 
match – and hence settle – remittance outflows is Corporate in character, and derives from 
business of various kinds operating in the countries where the remittance payments are 
ultimately made, it would be quite wrong to conclude that Corporate hawala is solely 
restricted to third-world arenas: there are also sound financial reasons why businessmen 
operating in metropolitan arenas in Europe and North America may also find themselves 
participating in the system.  
9.2.5 Consider, for example, a mainline manufacturer whose market includes a significant 
number of customers based in countries with tight restrictions over importers’ rights of access 
to foreign exchange – as is the case in Iran, India and China, for example. Whilst such 
customers may be eager buyers of the manufacturer’s products, they are simply not in a 
position to cover his invoices (or at least very substantial part of the full purchase price) 
through the formal banking system in their own country. But if the manufacturer is prepared 
to accept payment in cash – or at least from another banking source – to meet his invoice, he 
can sell his product for the full price, and the importer can settle the bill by utilising informal 
hawala networks which circumvent the local exchange controls which would otherwise 
prevent him from doing so. Such practices are clearly widespread, and in no sense illegal – at 
least from a UK perspective. Indeed deals of this kind are sometimes actively encouraged by 
HMG. One such case is BAE’s multi-billion Al Yamamah contract with Saudi Arabia, in 
which BAE is recompensed in kind – namely in tanker-loads of oil. Whilst it would be 
erroneous to identify ‘swaps’ of this kind in a straightforward way as Hawala, they are in fact 
organised on exactly the same basis.  
9.2.6 However by contrast with the one-off swaps which underpin deals such as Al 
Yamamah, Hawala is well organised system which is readily available as a means of settling 
invoices of all kinds swiftly, reliably and cheaply on a truly global scale: indeed it is so 
efficient that commercial enterprises no less than migrant workers remitting relatively minute 
amounts to their kinsfolk back home can also find that the system offers significant financial 
advantages. This is particularly so when the proprietors of commercial enterprises are also in 
a position whereby they can establish their own bona fides of trust within the system, since 
entry costs then drop to virtually zero.  
9.2.7 A simple example will serve to illustrate this. Consider, for example, the case of a 
Cash-and-Carry clothing merchant in Manchester who is of Pakistani origins, and who buys 
most of his stock from manufacturers in China. If he has a personal contact with a Hawaladar 
in Dubai (and such Hawaladars routinely visit UK to make those contacts), he might well 
telephone him to let him know that he wishes to settle an invoice for £50,000 from his 
Chinese supplier; let us also suppose that an Indian running a machine-tool business in 
Leicester has sold £50,000 worth of equipment to a customer in Iran, who is only in a 
position to pay by Hawala, in a deal which will be routed through Dubai. Whilst neither of 
the two Asian businessmen in the UK will know – or ever need to know – of each other’s 
existence, the Dubai Exchanges specialise in matching up such transactions.  In the simplest 
of examples (reality is normally a great deal more complex) a deal would be done whereby 
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£50,000 is collected in cash from the clothing manufacturer and delivered directly to the 
machine tool business in Leicester. A double settlement is thereby quickly, efficiently and 
very efficiently achieved – and matched by a complex series of further transactions overseas, 
all orchestrated from Dubai.  
9.2.8 This is, of course, a highly simplified example. In real life such a neat match of dates 
and sums to be transferred is very rarely achieved, so the sums involved are much more 
regularly consolidated and deconsolidated so they fit to customers demands. Secondly the 
case is frequently switched between sectors, so it could well be that the currency notes 
delivered to the machine-tool business actually came from individuals sending money home 
to their relatives in Pakistan as from a Cash and Carry business. Thirdly one or other of those 
involved might not be based in Britain at all, so the cash delivery might well be made to a 
business in Amsterdam rather than in Leicester, and be run by an Iraqi Kurd rather than an 
Indian. Last but not least since the total outflow of funds deposited by individual South 
Asians in the British-based component of the hawala system is clearly very much larger than 
the than the potential take-up for such funds from commercial recipients and so forth, a large 
surplus remains to be dealt with: this is routinely converted into dollars by British-based 
wholesale Hawaladars who have set up a foreign exchange account with a local bank, from 
where it is routinely transmitted onward in bulk by TT to New York, where it is further 
distributed according to instructions emanating from Hawaladars in Dubai.  
9.3 A system without records? 
9.3.1 A frequent criticism of this system – which is as frequently voiced by those in pursuit 
of ‘terrorist finance’ as it is by formal bankers who alarmed to find their business being 
undercut by competition from hawaladars – is that Hawala is a system without records. How 
far is this true? 
9.3.2 One point worth making at the outset is that if that charge is indeed true, hawala is 
nevertheless a remarkably safe mode of money transmission. Despite handling many millions 
– and possibly hundreds of millions – of dollars everyday, there is very little sign of customer 
dissatisfaction, or of huge sums of money going missing on the way. How can that be? Two 
answers can be proffered. Firstly the role of trust: the whole system does indeed depend on 
absolute trust – or to put it another way, that the sanctions which can be deployed against any 
one foolish enough to betray that trust are be extremely severe. Secondly it is not a system 
without records.  
9.3.3 Just as in any other system, the way in which data is recorded and checked is specific 
to the system: every office orders its records differently. This is partly because there are 
numerous possible ways of doing so, and these choices are further conditioned by the 
business the office is supervising. Whatever the personal preferences of the office manager, 
the records of a steel mill will be quite differently organised from those in a doctor’s surgery. 
So, too, with hawala. Whilst it is just as much of a money transmission as operation as is a 
formal banking sector business such as Western Union, the business is organised in a very 
different way. Above all it is a distributed system which is grounded in expectations of 
absolute trust, and hence of mutual guarantees, which hold across the entire system. As a 
result it has no need for expensive central headquarters in London or New York to which 
details of every single transaction are returned for scrutiny. Hawala has no central filing 
system of this sort because its records are as distributed as the system itself:  that is the 
source of its efficiency as well as its flexibility, and of course its ability to compete on price 
with the bureaucratic behemoths of which the formal banking sector is now composed.  
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9.3.4 Behemoths may well find the competition unwelcome. But for them to complain, as 
they do, that hawaladars are breaking all the rules is rather like someone who arrives for a 
running race equipped with steel-shod armour-plated boots complaining that some his 
competitors are wearing running shoes: or in other words equipped with the bare necessities 
for swift movement on a well-prepared running track. Whilst formally constituted Banks may 
indeed be handicapped by the cost of supporting their armour-plated administrative and 
record-keeping systems, it is nevertheless quite inaccurate for them to suggest that hawala 
systems dispense with record systems altogether. On the contrary records are indeed kept 
within the hawala system: the sums of money involved are simply to large, and the 
transactions too many and too complex for those involved to rely on memory alone. However 
records are only kept on ‘a need to know’ basis. Hence those whose only role in a given 
transaction is to act as money transmitters will only have – and will only expect to have – 
instructions about the arrival of a consignment of money, and to where it should be sent. He 
is most unlikely to know where the money has come from (for it may well have been 
consolidated from several sources), or where it is ultimately going to, especially because it 
may well be re- and de-consolidated again several times over before it reaches its final 
destination. It also follows that the prospect that the money transmitter (or indeed any other 
link in the huge chain of hawaladars) will be privy to the detailed modalities of the entire 
range of transactions in which they are precipitating is virtually non-existent.  There is 
nothing inherently suspicious about this in the context of a distributed system. Moreover 
when considered closely, formal banking systems – particularly at a global level – share these 
distributed characteristics.  From this perspective hawala money transmitters can be seen to 
be in the same position as commercial banker who receives a payment from a client (and not 
infrequently from his clients’ agent) asking for funds to be taken from one account and 
transferred into account number such and such in the name of so and so in such and such a 
branch of a such and such a bank on the far side of the world.  
10 Conclusion  
10.1 On being the importance of being ‘light-footed’ 
10.1.1 As well as being ‘light-footed’ in organisational terms, the nimbleness of hawala 
operations are further reinforced by their strongly entrepreneurial character. Not only have 
most contemporary hawaladars only been in the business for relatively short periods – even 
the UAE Exchange, currently the king-pin of the entire system, is less than thirty years old – 
but they all continue to look out for every possible avenue of competitive advantage. One 
way of doing so is to move steadily up the system, so enabling one to operate at ever higher 
levels of consolidation: whilst the margins grow ever tighter, the profits that can be reaped 
from process yet larger transactions still nevertheless grow steadily larger. It follows that 
everyone operating at a lower level in the market has an interest in moving up a rung – 
always provided that they have both the capital resources and the organisational nimbleness 
to hack it at that level. However even when hawaladars do move up market to become 
wholesale and mega-wholesale operators, few cease to operate at lower levels in the system. 
Just as most UK-based hawaladars continue to conduct over-the-counter retail business 
alongside their consolidated wholesale business, so, to, does the UAE Exchange, as well as 
most Hawaladars in India and Pakistan.  
10.1.2 Although it seems quite clear that Indian and Pakistani operators play a leading role in 
the global system of hawala, there is in my view no need to see the practices they have 
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evolved as being uniquely grounded in South Asian cultural traditions.  This point can be 
underlined in several different ways. 
i) it is quite unnecessary to argue that South Asian hawaladars have gained such global 
salience because the propensity to do hawala deals is somehow ‘in the blood’. Their 
current position can be much more straightforwardly explained as a result of the huge 
scale of labour migration from the sub-continent, which generated an 
unprecendentedly large demand for a means to facilitate remittance payment back 
home.  
ii) it is equally clear that neither the capacity to remit, nor the capacity to construct 
networks of trust to facilitate Informal Value Transfers over long distances is in any 
sense uniquely South Asian: instead such developments can be expected to occur 
within any community whose members sustain tightly knit extended networks of 
kinship and quasi-kinship.  
iii) the higher up the hawala consolidation system one moves, the less and less likely 
settlement by means of simple bilateral swaps becomes. The hub in Dubai is all about 
multilaterality, and its capacity to facilitate complex swaps between networks 
operating on a basis of unqualified trust in European, North America, West Asian, 
Iranian, Afghan, South Asian, Chinese, and South East Asian markets. Once 
relationships of trust are in place, which at this level are organised primarily in terms 
of  quasi-kinship, differences of ethnicity and nationality are no obstacle to the 
construction of hawala deals.  
10.2 The growth of hawala in the contemporary world 
10.2.1 In keeping with both Dr. Wilson’s and Professor Passas’ findings, my studies of the 
hawala system have led me to conclude that the whole contemporary edifice – which 
incorporates all those active in the hawala system whose deals are ultimately settled in Dubai 
– has grown up in response to some dramatic developments which have taken place during 
the course of the last few decades. As a result number of interlocking factors have 
precipitated a rapid growth of – and in some senses a comprehensive re-invention of – the 
hawala system. These factors include: 
• An explosion in the number of migrant workers from the third world moving to the Gulf 
and Euro-America during the past three decades, followed by a parallel explosion in the 
volume of remittances they have sent back home. 
• The growth of electronically based international banking, as opposed to ‘Telegraphic 
Transmission’. Until not so long ago TT really involved sending a telegram.  
• The high levels of commission which mainline banks still charge for TTs, even though 
telegrams were no longer sent. 
• An explosion in the scale of manufacturing-for-export business through South and South 
East Asia. Whilst the ultimate market for these manufacturers is Euro-America, such 
manufacturing has also generated a large volume of intra-regional trade (and now 
migration, for that matter). 
• The re-imposition of exchange controls in many parts of this region as a result of recent 
financial crises, such that many such manufacturers prefer to see their invoices settled in 
US$ rather than in their local currency.  
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10.2.2 Put together, these factors opened up major opportunities for entrepreneurial 
initiatives for hawala operators. On the one hand they provided a means of evading the 
obstacles to free trade established by those governments which sought comprehensively to 
regulate all aspects of national economic activity: India and China provide particularly 
graphic examples of that tendency – but many other regimes were not very far behind them. 
If hawala therefore oiled the wheels of mechanisms which had virtually ground to a halt in 
the face of excessive regulation, it also did so in successful competition with formally 
constituted international banks, which the hawaladars were nimble and skilful enough to be 
able to beat at their own game.  
10.2.3 However this did not involve them doing anything intrinsically illegal. Rather by the 
articulation of trust through informal reciprocal networks, rather than through elaborate, 
expensive and sclerotic bureaucratic procedures, hawaladars developed a structure through 
which to move money around the globe much more swiftly, much more cheaply and just as 
reliably as formally organised banks – and still make a profit as they did so. To be sure their 
skills enabled them to drive a coach and horses through the constraints of excessive 
regulation – much to the chagrin of those committed to regulation, and who believed that 
commercial deals should be regarded as illegitimate unless they had received a regulators’ 
imprimatur. In defence of their position, battered regulators frequently argued that those who 
operated these underground banking systems made immense fortunes in the ‘black market’, 
and that they deserved to be prosecuted for their pain. However the initial premise of those 
who make such arguments is mistaken. Hawala is at least as competitive as is any other form 
of commercial organisation and in some senses more so. Hawaladars may deal in immense 
sums of money, but competition is both fierce and continuous, and margins are very small. 
Profits can only be made by keeping one’s overheads even smaller than one margins:  
successful Hawaladars therefore make profits, but on a very much smaller scale than excited 
journalistic imagination often suggests.  
10.2.4 There is no evidence that they contemporary hawala system is the outcome of an 
explicit plan of any sort. Despite the huge volume of funds which currently passes through its 
operators on a daily basis, it has no Mr. Big; rather, like Topsy, it just growed. This growth 
appears to have been the outcome of initiatives taken by a myriad of small-scale 
entrepreneurs responding to opportunities as and when they encountered them with the result 
that the contemporary hawala system has expanded very rapidly from a small base. Most 
hawaladars at every level in the system are therefore relatively new to the game. Moreover 
since the system has grown so rapidly, most hawaladars – including the super-wholesalers – 
appear to have entered the system as retail hawaladars very recently indeed. But given that 
moving up a step in the system opens the prospect of generating ever-larger profits, all the 
most skilled entrepreneurs are constantly seeking to do deals which will enable them to move 
up a grade.  
10.2.5  Hence the largest returns in the British market are no longer made by retail 
hawaladars, or even by wholesale money transmitters, but rather by skilled entrepreneurs who 
are busily engaged in sewing up large scale deals through one or other of the Exchange 
Houses in Karachi, or better still in Dubai. All deals at this level appear to be constructed ad 
hoc, and there is fierce competition between lower level hawaladars for the opportunity to 
implement them. It is, of course, the setters-up of the very largest and most consolidated deals 
who reap the greatest profits, but only in rare circumstances will they be able to undertake the 
entire operation themselves. Hence in normal circumstances Exchange House operators will 
also rely on all sorts of agents, gophers and sub-contractors who are only to eager to assist the 
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higher level consolidator, both to gain a share in the deal, and in the hope that their 
experience of participating in such higher-level deals will in the long run enable them to book 
a place at the next level up.   
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